

### THREE *Ideology and Emotion*

The emotive factors in ideological consent are clearly extensive. I have already touched on some in connection with self-interest, desire, and despair. This chapter will focus on what are probably the two most ideologically consequential types of affective attitude. In psychoanalytic terms, these are “narcissism” and “transference,” and they are closely related to what social psychologists refer to “ingroup” and “outgroup” relations. The first case deals with those forms of emotion and cognition in which a subject sees someone else as a sort of version of him or herself. The second case deals with those forms of emotion and cognition in which a subject sees someone else as definitively different from and even opposed to him or herself. The former is based on identification, while the latter is expressed in an “object attitude,” such as love, hate, admiration, or envy.

More exactly, when someone consents to war, racial oppression, a sexual division of labor, or an economic hierarchy, he or she feels something about the people involved. One may identify with other people—not merely in the sense of seeing that particular interests coincide but in feeling a nonrational joy in their individual or collective successes or sorrow in their failures, independent of the effect such successes and failures might have on one’s own life. On the other hand, one may feel disgust (such as for gay men), loathing (for Arabs, for instance), or sentimental affection (perhaps for women). These feelings are just as important as one’s beliefs in determining whether or not one consents to a given social structure, policy, or whatever.

Identification may be interpreted, first of all, as a function of self-conception. People understand themselves—much as they understand other people or material objects—in terms of a hierarchy of properties and relations. For example, I am male, have blue eyes, and wear brown pants. I have all these properties. But in my self-conception, I am more centrally male than blue eyed, more centrally blue eyed than wearing brown pants. Identification may be seen as an affective attachment to another person or persons insofar as they share certain properties with me that are key to my self-understanding, properties that are high in my hierarchized self-concept (for research on this in a literary context, see Klementz-Belgardt 1981, 367–68, including the citations). Thus I am, in general, more likely to identify with men than with people wearing brown pants.

Gender, race, and ethnicity are some of the properties most commonly privileged in self-definition, and thus, some of the properties most commonly determinative of identification. Moreover, they are the most socially consequential properties of this type. I will refer to them as “essential.” This is not, of course, because they really do isolate a genuinely definitive aspect of one’s being. Rather, it is because they are widely understood—self-consciously and motivationally—as definitive. Though these properties may be acknowledged as being open to alteration, they nonetheless tend to be conceived of as permanent, as both intrinsic and constant. In other words, people tend to see them simply as part of what they are, such that if these properties changed, a person’s identity would change also. As well, people tend to see them as not varying, not shifting with circumstances, and so on. I do not think of myself as male in one context and female in another.

Contrast this to properties related to employment. These do not operate as essential properties, since they are not conceived of as permanent. If Smith is a white male factory worker, he is likely to find it unimaginable that he would be “the same person” if he were to become black or female. Yet there is no such problem with respect to his being a factory worker. He may well believe that it is practically impossible that he would ever, say, start his own business. But imagining such a development does not contradict his sense of identity. Similarly, being fired from his job might be devastating for him. But “unemployed Smith” is unlikely to be a conceptual anomaly for him, in the way, say, “female Smith” would be.

Obviously, the conception of identity is fuzzy here. But that is necessary, because Smith's own conception of identity is likely to be fuzzy. For our purposes, all that matters is that Smith would imagine some changes to be disruptive of his personal identity and others not. Note also that this imagination of identity has no bearing on actual consequences of real change. Suppose Smith discovers that he is not an English Anglican, as he had always thought. Instead, he is the child of Pakistani Muslims, a group that he had always loathed and seen as the antithesis of his own. In fact, this may result in far less dislocation in his sense of self or general emotional well-being than getting fired from his job, even though he previously imagined his ethnicity to be essential. The point is not that, say, ethnicity really is one of the most psychologically consequential properties of Smith, but rather that Smith is likely to conceive of it that way, and to act on that conception.

This already has direct ideological consequences. The fact that race, for example, is conceived of as essential while employment is categorized as contingent means that people will be predisposed to identify with others based on race and not employment. While solidarity is not simply a matter of feeling identification, it is clearly aided and advanced by such feeling. Moreover, solidarity can be undermined if it runs counter to identification. Marxist theorists have frequently commented that it is remarkably easy to divide members of the working class by race, sex, and ethnicity. In part, this is a matter of microhierarchization, as discussed above. It is also a matter of the psychological structure of identification, however. It is always easier to foster identification based on essential as opposed to nonessential or "contingent" properties—on sex or race, rather than economic class.

Note that this is partly a matter of the properties themselves. Many are simply not good candidates for essences. To be a good candidate, in this sense, a property should generally be salient and, even more important, enduring. Employment status is neither. Its obvious alterability in particular makes it almost impossible to categorize as essential. Sex and skin pigmentation, in contrast, are extremely good candidates, both in saliency and durability.

On the other hand, something does not become an essential property on its own but rather, only when it is rendered broadly socially functional. Consider two other properties likely to count as intrinsic and constant: height and handedness. I do not know of any data on these, yet my con-

ture would be that height and handedness almost never count as essential (that is, almost no one in the United States today would find it anomalous to imagine him or herself with a different height or the opposite handedness). The same could just as easily have been true of race, for example. But it is not. Why? Because race is broadly functionalized in society.

Among essentialized categories, sex appears to have a unique place. Some feminists have argued that sexual oppression is the earliest form of oppression, and the model for other forms. In any case, sexual hierarchization does appear to be the most widespread type of social division based on essential properties. It seems, moreover, to have a special cognitive position in people's conception of essence-based stratification (for instance, it enters into conceptualizations of race). This is precisely the outcome one would expect from what has just been said, in that sex is enduring, salient, and from the beginning, socially functional—for sex differences are, after all, crucial to reproduction. This is not to say that sex has to be functionalized in a division of labor or stratification of political power. This is merely to say that since sex (unlike, say, race) *necessarily* has significant and widespread social consequences, it is likely to be essentialized in any society.

As the preceding statement indicates, a socially functionalized property is not of merely local importance. It is not a matter of narrow and unusual circumstances. Rather, a functionalized property is one that has systematic consequences for the distribution of social goods and opportunities. This typically involves the extension of the property in question outside of those activities to which it is directly and necessarily germane (such as from breast feeding to child rearing more generally). An essentialized property is the most extreme form of this—one tacitly understood and acted on as *relevant in all circumstances*. Most properties are considered relevant only in specific contexts. Height, for one, is relevant to playing basketball or having certain roles in a drama, but it is not relevant to being a nurse or doctor, taking a mathematics class, and the like. In principle, the same should be true of sex, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and so on. For example, sex is relevant to sexual desire and reproduction, but it should not be relevant to being a nurse or doctor, or to taking a mathematics class. Most people believe it is relevant, though—even most of those who believe that they believe it is not relevant (that is, most people have a motivational belief of this sort, even most of those whose self-conscious belief is the opposite).

That putatively universal relevance is what makes sex “essential,” and thus crucial to identification.

But these essentialized properties are not the most basic or definitive ones for humans. The most basic is subjectivity, one’s existence as a thinking, feeling person. To lose this subjectivity is to lose one’s identity entirely. All identification is, then, necessarily based on a sense of shared subjectivity. I will use the phrase “narcissistic identification” to refer to identifications based on sex, race, and other presumptively essential properties that are narrower than subjectivity. Consent is fostered by the encouragement of narcissistic identification and the discouragement of the broader identification by subjectivity alone. For identification by subjectivity alone would push against stratification. More precisely, in cases where the social structure involves the systematic degradation and suffering of many people (such as blacks or women), consent is often partially contingent on the denial or diminishing of the subjectivity of those people. This, in turn, operates to inhibit identification.

Perhaps the simplest way to undermine such identification is through indirect dehumanization: simply avoiding any statements that would serve to recall the subjectivity of the enemy, underclass, or whomever. There were many examples of this during the Gulf War. For instance, this was one effect of the obscurity of the war briefings. One reason for referring to “collateral damage” rather than “dead civilians” is that the latter phrase foregrounds subjectivity and thus encourages identification. Similarly, due to the paucity of reporters in Iraq, media viewers rarely saw dead Iraqi civilians. More commonly, people’s images of the war were built up from night photographs of such things as targeted buildings or computer-generated schematics of smart bombs—representations that necessarily obscured the humanity of the people targeted and bombed.

More direct denial of subjectivity is common as well, and was also much in evidence during the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein, so often a synecdoche for the people of Iraq, was repeatedly characterized as an animal—a dog, a snake—or as insane, and hence, lacking identifiable subjectivity. The Iraqi people themselves were repeatedly depicted as subhuman or deranged. Iraqi troops were referred to as ants, insects, or fish in a barrel. Holly Sklar (1991) reported that “a U.S. pilot described knocking out Iraqi tanks along the Kuwaiti border this way: ‘It’s almost like you flipped on the light in the kitchen late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying, and we’re

killing them' ” (60; see also Solomon 4). As to insanity, beyond the general portrayals of Muslims as lunatics, there were also more specific references to the Iraqi people. For example, I saw a comedian do a routine in which he gave different countries the names of rock groups. He held up a map of Iraq at one point and announced, “Ten Thousand Maniacs.”

As these instances already suggest, the premise for explicit attempts to undermine subjectivity-based identification is invariably intergroup difference—the claim that Europeans are like this, but Arabs or Africans are like that; that men are like this, but women are like that. Teun van Dijk's (1987) research indicates that the most fundamental and common assertion of racism is “They are different” (67; unlike the past, this claim is now more often cultural than biological—see Essed 1991, 14, 248).

On the other hand, the precise nature of this division, the precise terms in which the difference is defined, is obviously relevant as well. While identification is partly a mere formal matter—a matter of categorizing oneself and the other person as “the same”—it is also a matter of vicarious thought and feeling. When people identify with someone, they mentally run through the sorts of ideas, plans, and feelings that they imagine run through the other person's mind. This is much the same process as when people are faced with some hypothetical situation. Suppose a close friend, Smith, receives a demeaning letter from his or her departmental tenure committee, and I am given a copy of the letter. If I identify with Smith, then in reading the letter, I will spontaneously feel stabs of pain, intimations of despair, moments of anger; I will imagine possibilities for response (to the letter's claims about scholarship or teaching) and so on—all according to my general understanding of Smith.

As the discussion thus far may have appeared somewhat pessimistic about solidarity, it is worth dwelling for a moment on identification of this subjective empathic variety. At first it may seem odd that one can identify with others at all. It may appear that people experience themselves directly, and so, to genuinely “sym-pathize” or “suffer with” anyone else would be impossible. How, after all, could anyone “indirectly,” “vicariously,” or “empathically” feel what someone else feels? In fact, the human mind operates in such a way as to make this sort of fellow feeling quite common. Research indicates that this sort of “parallel” emotion extending from one person to another is achievable even by a simple decision to “adopt the perspective” of the other person (see Davis 1994, 124–25). Moreover, as

Mark Davis explains, “instructions to imagine the affective state of a target frequently trigger a process which ends in the offering of help to that target” (145), or at least aids in “inhibit[ing] aggressiveness” (162).

This may seem anomalous as individuals do not have direct access to the minds of others. But people do not have direct access to their own feelings, ideas, reactions, and so forth, except immediately at the moment they are experiencing them—and even then self-knowledge is limited. As such, people have to infer the causes of their own emotional and other reactions (see Nisbett and Ross 1980, 226–27). Sometimes this is easy (if I am depressed after losing my job, the cause is obvious), but sometimes it is not (“I’ve been depressed all week, although I’m not sure why”). Moreover, practical planning and decision making, as well as nonpractical fantasy, rely on an ability to project one’s own feelings, reactions, and such into hypothetical situations. In short, individuals are faced every day with the problem of understanding their own current feelings and reactions, and imagining their own feelings and reactions in different—hypothetical or expected—circumstances. That problem is almost exactly the same as understanding, imagining, projecting, and identifying with other people’s feelings and reactions. To identify empathically with other people is only to engage in a variant of the sort of thing one does with oneself all the time.

Of course, just how self-projection occurs is not easy to explain. One possibility is something like the following. First, a person’s cognitive apparatus involves the accessing and application of schemas. These schemas may be broadly divided into “procedural” schemas that guide processes of thought or action, and “representational” ones that provide representational content. The procedural schema for riding a bicycle is not some representation of a bicycle or what riding a bicycle would involve. It is not an object of thought at all. Rather, it is a structured capacity to act, thereby allowing one to ride a bicycle without having to reflect on the process. Procedural schemas clearly incorporate representational schemas. For example, the procedural schema for riding a bicycle would involve the representational schema of a bicycle, for that allows people to recognize a bicycle when they see one.

The projection of oneself into different situations is a function of some sort of procedural schema, along with representational schemas, of others and oneself. Note that even in most *egocentric* cases, projection involves imagining other people’s feelings and reactions as well as one’s own.

Suppose, for example, I have received a negative tenure letter and am envisioning possible responses, including an interview with the dean's council. Insofar as I am doing this realistically, I need to take into account the likely actions and reactions of the council, and myself in interaction with them, primarily by drawing on the representational schemas just mentioned. What distinguishes the schema of me from those of others in this context is not so much differences in knowledge, for all these cases involve inference and hypothesis. The primary difference is that my self-schema provides the point of view for the scenario. In other words, it is given attentional focus and defines the relevance of outcomes. In projecting a scenario from my own perspective, I focus attention on myself and execute the procedural schema in such a way as to follow through just those outcomes relevant to me. Thus, I try to imagine whether a particular action might convince the dean to award me tenure. I do not try to visualize, say, consequences for the dean's life outside of my situation. In part, empathic identification is merely a variation on this. It is a matter of shifting the point of view—that is, running a procedural schema such that the representation of someone else receives attentional focus and defines the relevance of imagined outcomes.

To return to the notion of dehumanization, in many cases, my only representational schema of other people is one of bare subjectivity. If the humanity of an oppressed group is entirely obscured (by such phrases, for instance, as “collateral damage”), there will not be any representational schemas of other people when I run relevant procedural schemas. When I “imagine” the Gulf War, I may have representational schemas of human U.S. pilots, but not of human Iraqi soldiers or civilians. For example, I may imagine buildings collapsing, but without any people in them. This is not to say that I would explicitly assert there were no people in the buildings. But when I run a hypothetical schema of the bombing in my mind, that procedural schema will incorporate representational ones of U.S. pilots doing the bombing, without any representational schemas of Iraqi people. Put differently, there are U.S. schemas that can serve to define a point of view. In a *Walter Mitty*-like scenario, I can identify with the pilot, bravely entering Iraqi air space, deftly avoiding enemy fire, bearing in on the “asset.” Yet there is no representational schema of an Iraqi woman, holding her two children, wondering whether to flee the building as she hears



the planes approach, feeling the panic as the bombs explode and the building collapses around her.

In the case where Iraqi humanity is directly undermined (rather than obscured), I may have representational schemas, yet they are likely to be bestial or insectlike, nonhuman ciphers that cannot serve to define a perspective. Or if they are human, they are rendered dysfunctional through claims of difference.

Specifically, the content of ideological assertions concerning hierarchized group difference is fairly constant and contributes directly to dehumanization. Members of the dominant group (men, whites, Europeans, straights) are characterized as rational, methodical, and restrained, while members of the dominated group (women, blacks, Arabs, gays) are depicted as irrational, emotional, and hysterical. One way of discouraging identification is by presenting the thought processes of the opposed or oppressed group as inscrutable, most often due to inconsistency or even insanity. If another person's thought processes are incomprehensible, if he or she is unpredictable in thought or feeling or action, one simply cannot invoke any representational schema in his or her regard. Even the bare schema of human subjectivity assumes a commonality of reaction to pain, disappointment, or insult; it assumes a similarity in aspiration, desire, and moral principle. Even the bare schema of human subjectivity involves structure and predictability. To make the Other incomprehensibly different is, in effect, to make him or her inhuman, by making his or her feelings and ideas merely random. The situation is only made worse when that other person is viewed as duplicitous as well—a further racist and sexist commonplace. To take one example from the Gulf War, in *U.S. News and World Report*, Judith Kipper maintained that, "We go in a straight line; [Arabs] zig-zag." More exactly, "They can say one thing in the morning, another thing at night and really mean a third thing" (quoted in Naureckas 1991, 9). The similar sexist clichés about female illogic are too well known to require repetition.

#### GROUP HIERARCHY, SELF-ESTEEM, AND TRAUMA

As these illustrations reveal, ideologically functional identification, or narcissistic identification, is not purely subjective and humanly encompassing but oppositional. Narcissistic identification necessarily involves not only

links with one group of people but the denial of links with the complement of that group. For example, to identify oneself narcissistically as white is to see oneself as (emphatically) not *black*. This sort of identification, furthermore, is bound up with a wide range of oppositionally defined judgments and evaluations, concerning such things as intellectual or moral capacities, civil rights, and such. Thus, the systematic development of narcissistic identification serves to foster consent by undermining identification with members of oppressed groups, including those members of one's own oppressed group (say, workers) who are racially or sexually different. In connection with this, it also functions to give narcissistic meaning, and hence emotive force, to particular beliefs and desires that are independently consent inducing. If whites did not define themselves in narcissistic opposition to blacks, for instance, racist beliefs about black intellectual capacities would have far less affective power, and as such, less social effect.

Narcissistic identification is equivalent to what social psychologists refer to as ingroup identification. This is necessarily oppositional, since the ingroup is, by definition, opposed to an outgroup. Ingroup/outgroup divisions appear to be found in all societies and at all times. Perhaps the most fundamental of these divisions is that between the society itself and those outside the society—as in Greeks versus barbarians. This is a particularly easy division to reshape, toward oppressive ends, through dehumanization and the denial of subjectivity. “The anthropologist Robert Redfield has argued that the worldview of many peoples consists essentially of two pairs of binary oppositions: human/nonhuman and we/they. These two are often correlated, as Jonathan Z. Smith observes, so that ‘we’ equals ‘human’ and ‘they’ equals ‘not human’ ” (Pagels 1995, xviii). The case of the United States and Iraq is an obvious instance.

But ingroup/outgroup distinctions are by no means confined to that between the home and alien societies, or even to groups with obvious cultural or other differences. Any group division can give rise to narcissistic identification, even when it is based on nonsalient and changeable properties. Indeed, once an ingroup/outgroup distinction is established—even if arbitrarily—people tend to understand it as quasi-essential, expanding its relevance to all areas of thought and action. As John H. Duckitt (1992) describes it, “Individuals who are categorized into groups will exaggerate their similarity to fellow ingroup members and the dissimilarity of ingroup members to outgroup members, and this will occur on dimensions other

than the criterion for categorization" (81). In keeping with this, when ingroup/outgroup distinctions are elaborated, there is a cognitive tendency to understand members of outgroups "as relatively less complex, less variable, and less individuated" than members of ingroups (*ibid.*)—in short, as less human.

Here, the treatment of human cognition needs to be made a little more complex. Human thought is not guided by broad structures of properties and relations (that is, schemas) alone, or even primarily, but by prototypes also. A prototype may be understood as the "most standard" case of a certain broad category (compare Johnson-Laird and Wason 1977, 342). Consider the concept "bird." In part, birds are conceived of according to a broad schema that involves such properties as "has wings," "has a beak," "lays eggs," and so on. This does not mean that all birds are equally conceived of as birdlike. Nor does it mean that one's recognition of birds, understanding of any reference to birds, or imagination of birds treats all birds equally. In fact, birds tend to be recognized, understood, and imagined in relation to prototypes, not bare definitions. Thus, robins, sparrows, and jays are conceived of as more prototypical birds than eagles; and eagles are considered to be more prototypical than vultures; and vultures are seen as more prototypical than penguins. To take a simple case, if someone says, "There are lots of birds at the window," one expects sparrows and robins, not eagles. Indeed, even the schema for "bird" is not a mere listing of necessary and sufficient conditions but incorporates properties of the prototypical birds as "default" cases. For example, the default schema for birds would include "flies," even though that does not apply to, say, penguins. Insofar as one is dealing with a nonprototypical bird, one tends not to think of it, in the first place, as a bird at all; it is not understood by activating the "bird" schema. Rather, it is perceived more specifically, as a "vulture" or "penguin," activating those "lower-level" schemas. Hence, to return to the preceding example, if someone sees robins at the window, it is reasonable for him or her to refer to them as "birds," but if he or she sees eagles, it is probable that he or she will say "eagles."

This procedure—of understanding categories by reference to prototypes and default cases—often makes a good deal of sense. When extended broadly to humans, however, it can have unfortunate ideological consequences. There is a tendency to think of humans not only schematically but prototypically as well. In other words, some types of people are thought of

as prototypically human, others as less so, and others as hardly human at all. An understanding of humans operates along the same lines as an understanding of birds, with the same sort of hierarchization of prototypicality. In this case, prototypicality is largely a function of ingroup/outgroup relations. Members of my own group are, for me, more prototypically human than members of any other group. As a result, I am more likely to invoke the schema “human”—including the subschema of human subjectivity—for a member of my own group, and I am more likely to invoke a more specific schema for members of another group. White people, for instance, are likely to activate the schema “human” for other white people, but to activate the schema “black” for black people (much as they would activate the more general schema for prototypical birds, but the more specific schema for eagles or vultures).

The situation is, in some ways, even more extreme than this indicates. First of all, divisions between ingroups and outgroups are always hierarchical, and not only in prototypicality. As Duckitt (1992) points out, “Ingroup members are rated more favorably than outgroup members on evaluative trait ratings” (69). An ingroup/outgroup division, moreover, is evaluative even when it has no distinct social function, even when the division is completely random. Lawrence Hirschfeld (1996) explains that “simply telling subjects that they have been assigned to certain groups is sufficient to trigger ingroup favoritism. This is no less true when people are aware that the basis for group assignment is arbitrary” (1). When people are divided into groups in an explicitly arbitrary manner (say, by whether a particular digit in their social security number is odd or even) and do not interact with one another in any way, they still judge the activities and personality traits of ingroup members more favorably than those of outgroup members (Duckitt 1992, 68–69).

The situation only worsens when one goes beyond this minimal scenario. “The more salient the intergroup categorization is made,” notes Duckitt, “the stronger the tendency to show bias and discrimination in favor of the ingroup” (69). Plainly, then, this sort of division will be all the more consequential when it is defined in relation to such highly salient, stable, and socially functional properties as race or sex. As Hirschfeld (1996) puts it, ingroup/outgroup differences “stand out . . . to the extent that their physical correlates are clearly marked” and “that significant

economic, social, and other structural consequences are associated with them” (24).

But even this is not all there is to the consensual effects of ingroup/outgroup divisions. Following Elizabeth Anscombe (1981), one may divide enjoyment into two categories: “enjoyment of substance” and “enjoyment of facts.” One enjoys a substance when one enjoys the thing itself—an object or activity. One enjoys a fact when one enjoys the truth of some statement pertaining to the thing. If Jones does not care for exercise, he or she may enjoy the fact of having run three miles, but have found the experience itself (the substance) miserable. As this illustrates, the same division may be drawn for displeasure. Thus, Jones may have enjoyed the substance of sleeping all day, but may deplore the fact that he or she did this.

One might say that pleasures of substance are, for the most part, singular. They concern only themselves. The enjoyment of a substance involves an absorption in the experience of that substance—whether it is a matter of sexual pleasure, taste, or anything else. Many, perhaps all, pleasures of fact are not singular but comparative in at least three ways: with ideals, with oneself, and with others. Suppose I run three miles in twenty-four minutes. I may be pleased (take pleasure in the fact) because I had established an eight-minute mile as a sort of aspiration (comparison with an ideal). Or I may be pleased with this because it is faster than I have previously run three miles (comparison with self). Or I may be disappointed because the colleague with whom I was running completed three miles in twenty-two minutes (comparison with others).

Of these, comparison with others is typically the earliest—it is by comparison with others that one is able to evaluate oneself from childhood on. It is by comparison with others that ideals are established. In this way, the most fundamental evaluation of oneself, and thus the most fundamental pleasures in facts, derive from the comparison of oneself with others. This does not necessarily have to be crudely competitive or antagonistic. It is, in the first place, simply a necessary way of moving outside one’s own narrow experience of oneself in order to understand and evaluate one’s actions. To take a simple example: how am I to know whether I am running well if I have no idea how long or how fast other people run?

On the other hand, this sort of comparative evaluation tends to become crudely competitive and antagonistic if it is not transformed into an ideal,

if it remains a matter of direct interpersonal comparison. Here, a further distinction might be made between comparison that forms the immediate basis for self-evaluation and comparison that serves to establish an ideal. Suppose that I have been running three miles in thirty minutes, and I find that a colleague of roughly the same age and background is running three miles in twenty-five minutes. I may compare myself directly with him or her, then feel sad and inferior, or angry and resentful. In consequence, I may set out to beat him or her, to do better than he or she does. Alternatively, I may set this up as a new ideal for myself, evaluating my future runs in terms of progress toward this goal. If I evaluate myself by direct comparison only, then I will feel good if my colleague slows down, due to some physical ailment or decline in discipline. I will be happy to the extent that the difference between us diminishes, even if I myself am running at the same pace as before. In direct comparison, then, it is relative performance or value alone that matters. It is not the absolute value of how fast I can run but the relative value of the difference between my speed and that of my colleague. As such, any harm to him or her is a good for me. This is not true when I am evaluating myself relative to an ideal.

Unfortunately, the enjoyment of facts concerning ingroup/outgroup divisions appears to be a matter of direct comparison—hence hostile, antagonistic competition—in almost every case. As already noted, “when . . . subjects are asked to allocate rewards (or punishments) between ingroup and outgroup members, they do so in a manner that maximizes the differential between ingroup and outgroup even though this may reduce the absolute benefits to the experimental subjects or even to the ingroup” (Duckitt 1992, 68–69). Moreover, if subjects are divided into ingroups and outgroups and “are given the opportunity to discriminate,” they “show increased self-esteem” (85).

It is difficult to say just why this happens. It may simply be a spontaneous tendency, a basic “will to power.” Perhaps people’s immediate impulse is to denigrate members of any outgroup and evaluate themselves on the basis of that denigration. On the other hand, this behavior is not only cruel but so pathetic that it is hard to imagine it arising naturally out of biological development. Rather, it might be that people rely on direct comparison with others when they feel entirely unable to pursue ideals. While some people have the self-confidence and social opportunities to work to achieve ideals, others do not. Many people do not feel that the concrete conditions

of their lives allow them to work toward anything other than mere survival. Living for a long time without the possibility of pursuing ideals—working overtime simply to make ends meet; trying to keep some shred of emotional health after abuse at school, home, or work—habituates one to thinking and living in the more immediate terms of direct comparison. It is not that the establishment of ideals is a luxury. It is more like a necessity, in fact. Nonetheless, it is a necessity that requires time and means, and a reservoir of self-esteem to sustain one while pursuing these ideals. Since so many people do not have the time or means, or the requisite self-confidence, it is a necessity they have learned to live without. Yet its loss continues to degrade their emotional health, reducing them to this self-harming pettiness.

In any case, whether essentialism and narcissistic/oppositional identification are the result of a natural impulse driving people to build their self-esteem on the denigration of others, or the conditions of inequality that inhibit the formation and pursuit of ideals, or some other factor, it is at least clear that such identification and self-evaluation can be fostered or inhibited by society. Moreover, it is apparent that currently they are not inhibited but fostered, both as a series of specific identifications and a general mode of thought. For example, the family, education, newsmedia, and entertainment industry all contribute to the creation of an essentializing and oppositional gender identity. The family is structured along gender lines, and the child is understood in gender terms from birth, through all the stereotyped rituals of family behavior—from dressing male and female children differently to playing with or even speaking to them differently (see Gleason 1987; see also Fausto-Sterling 1985, 36). These differences are marked in oppositional terms as well, with actions and objects that are “for boys” being sharply distinguished from those that are “for girls.”

Spectator sports provide a striking portrait of a social practice that encourages narcissistic and oppositional thinking in more general and obviously competitive ways. The point of school or team spirit is to “support” the home side—to cheer it on, rejoice in its victories, and take pride in its accomplishments, while vilifying and loathing the opponent. In other words, the point is to identify narcissistically with the team in an oppositional manner, and base at least a part of one’s self-esteem on the superiority or inferiority of the home team relative to its rivals. This is true not only in professional sports but perhaps even more significantly in school

sports, especially high school sports with their often long-standing rivalries and associated rituals, from “pep rallies” to elaborate “homecoming” celebrations.

In this context, it is not surprising that sporting metaphors, and even direct connections with sporting events, were so common in the discussion and celebration of the Gulf War. The manufacture of consent for the war was intimately bound up with the narcissistic and oppositional principles of sport, from the widespread insistence that all Americans must “support the troops”—an insistence that the troops be cheered to victory like a sports team—to the flag waving at the Super Bowl and the Victory in the Desert video produced by NFL films (see “Victory” 1991, 63), from General Norman Schwarzkopf’s use of football plays to explain military strategy and Bush’s naming the war his “Super Bowl” (64), to one infantryman’s boast about killing twenty-seven Iraqi soldiers, “It seemed like high school, going into a football game. We were hyped up” (Colhoun 1991, 4; see also Andersen 1991, 4). As Salman Rushdie (1989) remarks in *Shame*, a good commander understands “the intimate relationship between sport and war” (221).

But the oppositional function of sport is not confined to war, or to the generalized reinforcement of competitive narcissism. Ian Buruma (1992) reports an experience that illustrates how it can operate to strengthen quite specific identifications and oppositions: “A week before Christmas I went to see a soccer match between teams from Rotterdam and Amsterdam, once a city with many Jews. I had the misfortune to sit with the Rotterdam supporters, about 20,000 of them, who bellowed ‘Jewish dogs’ every time an Amsterdam player had the ball. When the Amsterdam player happened to be black, he was a ‘Jewish nigger’ ” (16).

Up to this point, the focus has been on more or less straightforward cases of identification with members of an ingroup. There are instances, however, in which oppressed people do not identify with members of their own group but with those of the dominant group. This should briefly be considered before moving on, for it has significant ramifications for fostering consent.

“Cross identification,” as one might call it, has been most directly and widely attested among black children (see Hirschfeld 1996, 138). Specifically, many black children, when faced with pictures of black and white youth, explicitly identify themselves with the image of a white child, rather



than that of a black one. This sort of thing is no doubt found among adults as well—if necessarily in a less naive form, a form that includes a sense that such cross identification is not only mistaken but socially impossible. Take the character Eliza in Peter Abrahams's (1989) *Mine Boy*, who declares, "Inside I am not black and I do not want to be a black person" (60).

What appears to be going on here is that the prototype human for these particular black people is white, and they are simply associating themselves with that image. While that seems innocuous enough in and of itself, the effects of this "reverse prototypicality" on solidarity among the oppressed should be immediately obvious. The effects on an individual's emotional stability and sense of self-worth may be less apparent, but equally serious. Abrahams vividly portrays Eliza's mood swings, vacillations in self-esteem, and erratic behavior, as she shifts back and forth in her conception of herself and her understanding of what constitutes a prototypical human.

In some ways a more extreme form of this same sort of cross-identification may be found in such pathological phenomena as what psychoanalysts call "identification with the aggressor" (see Freud 1966, chapter 9). Oppression involves humiliation and physical suffering. If the suffering or humiliation is intense and prolonged enough, it gives rise to trauma. People are traumatized when they cannot rid themselves of the obsessive and painful recollection of the past, or a correlated fear of the future, when their lives come to be structured around trying to rid themselves of the memories and nightmares, or trying to avoid the return of the misery. In more pathological cases, individuals may, unconsciously, try to change that trauma, as if they could travel back in time and relive the moment.

There are two ways in which someone might try, unconsciously, pathologically, to remake a traumatic past. As just noted, they might take up the position of the person who inflicted the suffering. If Smith was traumatized by a beating as a child, he or she might relive and simultaneously repudiate the trauma by becoming a child beater him- or herself. Conversely, one might try to seduce one's torturer, inspire his or her love, like a wife who responds to her husband's beatings with still more kindness in the hope of drawing love out of his hate.

Suppose now that the traumatic suffering was not merely personal, but based on some narcissistic opposition, such as race. Racism clearly can produce deep traumas, when, for example, white faculty in a university

setting continually harass and demean a nonwhite colleague, insulting him or her at every opportunity, derogating his or her work, accusing him or her of criminal behavior without evidence of any kind. There are many ways that one can respond to this sort of treatment. One might join in deeper and more thorough solidarity with other people who are subjected to the same treatment, working toward a more decent society for all. But one does not always have a choice about these things, and sometimes the trauma is so emotionally destructive that it produces pathological forms of behavior. One receives what psychoanalysts refer to as a “narcissistic wound,” a devastation of one’s self-esteem, and one tries to heal it by repudiating the entire scenario. In one version, one might identify with the aggressor, behaving in the same cruel way to other minorities, making them suffer precisely the same trauma. In another, one becomes the emotional slave of white people, organizing one’s whole life around a quest for their approval and affection, as if that will soothe and close up the sore left by their earlier cruelty.

The same thing happens with women and sexism. Traumatized in her own tenure review, due to the misogyny of her colleagues, Jones may join in genuine solidarity with other women—and minorities and others who suffer discrimination—to work against unjust treatment. Yet she might equally impose the same sort of torture on women considered for tenure after her. Or she might devote the rest of her career to earning the respect of men in her department, gearing her work to produce just that effect.

In short, some pain may provoke resistance. But great pain is as likely to arouse pathological and debilitating varieties of consent—indeed, not merely consent but positive devotion to the system of cruelty that caused the pain to begin with.

#### COGNITIVE EXEMPLA

This discussion of trauma and identification with the aggressor leads to the topic of transference: a particular, pathological form of thought and action based on “exempla.” Before going on to transference, however, more ordinary forms of exemplum-based cognition and behavior need to be considered.

Understanding anyone involves a complex of memories, feelings, generalizations, and expectations, built up from one’s experience of the person in question as well as experiences of and common beliefs about persons

identified as members of the same group. If I hear that Jones is interested in postmodernism, I have certain beliefs, expectations, and feelings regarding him or her even before we meet. Some of these are schematic or prototypical. Yet some may be derived from particular postmodernists I have known; some may be based not on generalizations (that is, schemas and prototypes) but on specific instances. Indeed, when an object (such as another person) triggers an exemplum, so that the exemplum becomes particularly salient, it will most often override conceptualization in terms of schemas or prototypes.

This is well attested in psychological research. Richard E. Nisbett and Lee Ross (1980) illustrate the final point by a story about a bad Volvo (15; I have altered their example slightly). Suppose Smith has decided to buy a car. He reads all the relevant consumer reports and forms schemas for various types of cars. His schema for “Volvo” includes all the statistical properties he has read about, such as very high reliability. Smith has already decided that his major concern in choosing a new car is reliability. This should make Volvo one of his top choices. His brother-in-law, however, owned a Volvo that had an endless series of mechanical problems. Smith knows perfectly well that this single instance has no real implications regarding a Volvo he himself might purchase. A Volvo is still the most likely to be reliable, whatever problems his brother-in-law may have had. Nonetheless, he decides not to buy a Volvo—precisely because the salient exemplum has overridden the encompassing schema.

Exempla can operate to foster consent in a variety of ways. Indeed, they are particularly effective ideologically, for the same reason that they frequently override schemas: they are often highly salient and affectively charged. They are much more noticeable and much more likely to provoke some strong emotion—joy, anger, or fear. When I was a college student, the Bakke case certainly stood for many people as definitive of the consequences of affirmative action. At roughly the same time, Khomeini stood as a definitive exemplum of Islam for a broad range of people in the United States. Exempla may also be nameless, ordinary. For instance, whenever one conceives of or responds to current situations by reference to an anecdote, one is cognitively guided by an exemplum. In his studies of racist discourse, Teun van Dijk (1987) has found that racist anecdotes—concerning a friend who was mugged by a black man, a black woman who was trying to cheat a grocer, and so on—are a particularly common and effective

way of communicating racism. In fact, racist speech shows a particularly high reliance on exempla (157).

Ronald Reagan's tales about welfare queens fall into the same category—except that they were communicated nationwide, from a national authority, not told by an ordinary person in private conversation. As such, Reagan's anecdotes no doubt helped to consolidate the antagonism toward welfare that resulted in the cruel reform passed under Clinton. Again, exempla are salient and emotive, and thus, are likely to have far more motivational force than any schema formed out of statistical analysis. A bloodless statistic about the number of children who will be undernourished due to welfare reform is likely to be superseded in motivational force by a vivid story about a fat black woman driving around in her Cadillac to collect a dozen welfare checks. Indeed, the anecdote is likely to carry greater weight in subjective estimates of probability. As Norbert Schwarz (1995) has pointed out, drawing on extensive psychological research, “We estimate the frequency, likelihood, or typicality of an event by the ease with which we can bring relevant examples to mind” (371)—in other words, people estimate general patterns less by reference to schemas embodying those patterns than by salient exempla.

Of course, this is not to say that exempla preclude schemas. They tend instead to generate their own schemas; in other words, salient exempla tend to foster the formation of schemas, even if these are contradicted by statistics (compare van Dijk 1987, 198). Moreover, standard schemas, common stereotypes (usually a form of prototype), and salient exempla tend to reinforce one another—again, independent of statistical plausibility. As a consequence of this mutual reinforcement, “stories about ethnic minority groups are easier to find [that is, they are more cognitively salient, more prone to cognitive access] when they feature instantiations of stereotypical prejudices” (ibid., 279).

Recall, for example, the way in which George Bush's presidential campaign used William Horton's escape on furlough, and his subsequent crime, to defame Michael Dukakis's “liberal” policies as governor of Massachusetts—a straightforward use of a salient exemplum toward ideological ends. Clearly, a single case of this sort has no implications whatsoever for an understanding of Dukakis's policies—even his furlough program. Indeed, statistically, the furlough program operated to *reduce* the number of crimes overall. David Anderson (1995) observes that in “com-

paring those who had gone out on furloughs and participated in other pre-release programs with those who had not, they found that the programs substantially and consistently contributed to reduced recidivism.” As such, “ending furloughs would likely result in a net increase in crime” (109). This does not matter, however. The image/exemplum of (black) Horton raping a defenseless (white) woman was highly salient, memorable, and emotive—inspiring a sort of terror in anyone who might identify with his victim or her friends and relatives. It was, of course, far more salient and emotive than the schematic, statistically supported abstractions cited by Dukakis in defense of his program.

This exemplum could be used easily for ideological purposes because of its coherence with ideologically functional schemas, such as the standard racist one of black men as rapists. Indeed, the case was systematically misrepresented in such a way as to conform to such schemas. For instance, one distortion concerned Horton’s earlier crime, which was falsely presented as cannibalistic (Anderson 1995, 184)—drawing on the old colonial stereotypes about Africans.

Another important schema did not concern Horton but Dukakis—the schema of “liberals” as excessively lenient toward, and overly sympathetic with, criminals. This schema functions ideologically to establish Democratic Party crime policies as the “far Left” of the spectrum of rational opinion. If Democrats can be characterized as too lenient, then anything to their left must be irrational. Note that this is an ideological claim in which the Democrats are likely to be complicit, for they do not want any competitor to their left, and thus, have every motive to assist in characterizing liberal Democrats as the reasonable extreme of the political spectrum.

Perhaps most interestingly, the entire case fit a sort of narrative schema of random, violent crime, isolated by Anderson (1995) as particularly important in the United States over the preceding decade. This schema has five basic components: the crimes are “luridly violent”; the victims are “middle-class, usually white” and the perpetrators usually black; the victims are innocent; the victims were chosen at random; and the criminals had “some history of involvement with the criminal justice system, suggesting that if the system had only worked better, the terrible crime might have been avoided” (5–6). When one examines the way in which the Horton case was presented, it is clear that it was widely viewed through this schema—with relevant aspects highlighted and others downplayed, with

elements filled in according to this pre-given structure, etc. Anderson points out that the schema had such force that white criminals, such as Charles Stuart and Susan Smith, used a version of it to cover up their own crimes, blaming these crimes on black assailants (7–8; these were not isolated instances—for a series of related cases, see Russell 1998, chapter 5). Nonetheless, it is the exemplum that has the emotive and motivational force, not the schema alone.

I have been speaking thus far as if the exempla in question were at least putatively true. Exempla, however, can be explicitly fictional without losing their potential cognitive force. Television programs, movies, novels, and plays all provide people with exempla through which they think and feel about the world. This is one reason why the portrayal of, say, blacks or Arabs in these media is so politically important. Any prominent minority character from television to cinema can be taken up and operate as an exemplum. Indeed, this is why it is important to have a wide range of black, Arab, gay, lesbian, and other characters, so that none is likely to have the unique salience necessary to operate as an exemplum. For even a positive exemplum is, in these cases, problematic. A single exemplum of, say, gay men still conduces toward the view that gay men form a single, homogenous group.

It should be stressed that I am not saying people are too stupid to know the difference between fact and fiction. The point is, rather, that everyone's cognitive apparatus is structured in such a way that a vivid image is likely to have significant motivational effects, even when it is fictional—even when people recognize that it is fictional. My guess is that fiction is, on the whole, more effective than truth or putative truth when it comes to providing exempla of broader categories, such as war. People's experience of real war is always limited and fragmentary. But the experience of fictional war, most obviously on film, has a fullness, structure, and necessity. *Star Wars* or *Independence Day* provides a "complete" sense of a war—its background, motives, progress, and resolution. Films depict human stories of the "good guys" in detail, fostering identification; they show the perfidy of the "bad guys." For these reasons, it seems likely that these fictional wars are, for most people, more salient and emotive, and hence more likely to stand as motivationally consequential cognitive exempla, than real wars. When *Star Wars* first came out, it seemed immediately obvious that its division into the good rebels and religious-mystical Jedi, on the one hand, and the evil empire, on the other, would operate for ordinary people as an ex-

emplum for conceiving of and responding to the United States and Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan made use of this parallel in referring to the USSR as the “evil empire,” and even more so in propagandizing for his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), nicknamed, of course, “Star Wars.”

Note that in keeping with this, exempla do not, for the most part, operate consciously. They are typically not objects of self-reflective scrutiny, and thus, are akin to motivational rather than self-conscious beliefs. Indeed, the vast majority of inferences, conceptualizations, and the like proceed unconsciously, whether they are based on exempla, prototypes, or schemas. That is one of the primary reasons why they can be so effective in these cases. A self-conscious comparison of Reagan’s SDI with George Lucas’s film may have some motivational force. But the real effect of linking the two in people’s minds derives from the unconscious transferral of identification, feeling, and so forth. Suppose people identify strongly with the heroes of *Star Wars* whose lives are saved by the use of laser weapons; suppose filmgoers feel fear for them when facing the evil empire, then rejoice with them when they triumph using these weapons; suppose viewers feel a mild, vicarious lift in their self-esteem as the fair-haired and light-skinned heroes with whom they identify triumph over the swarthy out-group of evil—all of which I take to be a pretty standard response to the movie. People are unlikely to draw any self-conscious conclusions about SDI based on these feelings. Once SDI has been linked with these feelings, however, people are far more likely to support it. This is due to the non-conscious, motivational force of salient and emotive exempla. The situation here is parallel to that of Nisbett and Ross’s Volvo. Even a mass of technical analysis from reliable physicists and engineers is unlikely to overcome an enthusiasm for SDI that is derived from its link with *Star Wars*, just as a mass of consumer reports is unlikely to overcome Smith’s aversion to Volvos, derived from the case of his brother-in-law.

Even if a person does decide to go against the exemplum and oppose SDI, it is quite possible that the exemplum will dull this opposition, so that he or she will be less likely to take concrete steps to prevent its implementation. It may, in other words, reduce his or her opposition to “prompted assent” (or “prompted dissent”)—a belief that not only lacks motivational force but is not even maintained self-consciously and continuously, a belief that arises only when prompted by a question (as in, for example, an opinion poll).

Of course, exempla are not in and of themselves consensual. They are no more intrinsically ideological than beliefs. This is what makes left-wing, feminist, and antiracist literature and cinema so important. Still, exemplum-based thought can be exploited to consensual ends with ease. This is particularly evident in majority/minority relations. Simply due to the nature of salience—it is, in part, a function of rarity—the reduction of minorities to exempla will necessarily be far more widespread than that of majorities to exempla (see, for instance, Nisbett and Ross 1980, 239). This is problematic, because negative characteristics or events are likely to be more salient and carry greater emotional force than positive ones. For example, a crime will always have greater salience than ordinary noncriminal action, or even an unusual act of benevolence, whoever is involved. Therefore, criminal and other “deviant” acts by members of minority groups will be particularly salient and likely to be taken as exemplary. If one black man commits robbery and another makes a large donation to charity, these will not cancel one another out in their psychological effects and ideological consequences.

More generally, differences in salience are part of the reason members of a minority group are evaluated more negatively, even when the characteristics that define them as a minority are perceived as neutral. This has been demonstrated in research by David Hamilton and R. K. Gifford. Test subjects were shown sentences describing members of two groups, “A” and “B.” Group A was twice the size of Group B, but otherwise the groups were identical. In keeping with this, members of the two groups engaged in “undesirable behaviors” at exactly the same rate. Nevertheless, test subjects consistently overestimated the undesirable behaviors of members of the smaller group, rated that group less favorably, and so on (see Hamilton and Trolier 1986, 136). The situation is only going to be worse when there are preexisting stereotypes about the groups (such as when the groups are distinguished racially), stereotypes that further distort experience and memory through confirmatory bias.

#### TRANSFERENCE

Up to this point, the use of exempla has been explored in relation to persons or events of the same, politically consequential category—exempla of blacks guiding people’s thought about and action toward other blacks, exempla drawn from one war (perhaps a fictional one) guiding feeling and



response to other (real) wars. Yet there is another way in which exempla are politically consequential. There are certain occasions on which exempla are applied across putatively definitive or essential categories. For the most part, such cross-categorical connections are, so to speak, *ad hoc* and have little enduring consequence. Jones meets one particular Muslim, Akbar. Akbar happens to wear the same type of unusual glasses worn by Jones's close friend, Smith. This link happens to trigger the exemplum of Smith in Jones's mind, making him feel quite friendly toward Akbar, despite his general ill will toward Muslims—and despite the fact that Jones does not in general respond (self-consciously or motivationally) to “type of eyewear” as an interpretively or evaluatively relevant category. This sort of thing is common. But it is also unsystematic, and it is therefore politically inconsequential in most cases.

There is one particular case of this general sort that is systematic, however: transference. That is, the unconscious and partially pathological guidance of thought, feeling, and action by (unconscious) infantile exempla—primarily drawn from early fantasies concerning parents. The most psychologically consequential exempla are the first: the deeply ambivalent, oedipal exempla of one's parents—*imagoes*, as psychoanalysts call them. These *imagoes* remain with people from childhood, unconscious and deeply involved with repressed fantasies about other people and about themselves. In these fantasies, the *imagoes* are, as psychoanalysts say, “split,” divided into multiple versions so that one may speak of distinct types of maternal *imago*, paternal *imago*, or even self-*imago*.

Any exemplum is, of course, an idea of a thing, not the thing itself. Jones's exemplum of Khomeini is not Khomeini himself but a conception of Khomeini, a conception that is not only necessarily incomplete but may be wildly inaccurate. Indeed, there are exempla that do not correspond to any real person at all, as in the case of fictional characters. Similarly, there may be two entirely different exempla of one person. Suppose Jones has heard things about “the Ayatollah” and “Khomeini.” He forms ideas about both, and uses both as exempla, without ever realizing that they are the same person. Fantasies present an even more elaborated form of just this division between exemplum and reality. Suppose Jones is infatuated with Smith. In real life, Smith treats Jones badly. But in Jones's fantasy life, Smith is warmly affectionate. There is a sense in which it could be said that Jones's idea of Smith had been “split” into the unfriendly, real Smith, and

the affectionate, imaginary one. This can even happen independent of fantasy. Suppose I can't quite figure Jones out. One minute, I think he or she is being friendly, but the next minute I find him or her insulting. So I form two different conceptions of Jones. In one, Jones is convivial, friendly, and the seeming insults are intended as good-natured ribbing. In the other, Jones is hostile, and the seeming friendliness is just a strategy to prevent reprisals. Here, too, one might say that I have "split" my conception of Jones.

In psychoanalytic theory, the same sort of thing occurs with infantile imagoes. However, these are far more important than any other exempla. Indeed, these infantile imagoes, as one's first instances of persons, are equally one's founding instances of persons, the basic exempla on which all subsequent exempla are to some degree based. Due to his or her ambivalent, conflicted, confusing relations with all-powerful parents, the child too splits his or her parental imagoes. In general terms, this split may be characterized as one between affectionate and antagonistic. But there are many possible subdivisions within each category. According to classical psychoanalysis, the most common splits of the paternal imago would include the protecting father, the "castrated" or powerless father, and the "castrating" or aggressively hostile father. The most common splits of the maternal imago would include the nurturant mother, the withdrawn or inaccessible mother, and the devouring mother (who subsumes the child's whole being in her own).

Transference is, roughly, the unconscious incorporation of one or another parental imago into one's understanding of, affective response to, and behavior toward some person in one's contemporary environment. It is the use of an infantile imago as an exemplum, but it goes beyond this as well, for it simultaneously involves the unconscious incorporation of the "target" or contemporary person into a set of repressed infantile fantasies, and a sort of indirect enactment of those fantasies. When the transference includes the idealizing and affectionate elements of these imagoes, it is referred to as "positive"; when it incorporates the degraded or threatening elements, it is referred to as "negative." Both sorts of transference can play a significant role in fostering consent.

It is no doubt immediately evident when one reads of the most common forms of splitting that the fantasies surrounding parental imagoes are by no means simply natural or spontaneous. To a great extent, the oedipal

fantasies of a child are the product of a particular social structure, one in which women are in charge of immediate child care (hence nurturance) while men are given primary responsibility over the family's relation to the world at large (hence protection). Thus, a typical idealized father imago establishes the father, and anyone onto whom this imago is transferred, as an absolute source of knowledge, power, and protection. One typical idealized mother imago establishes the mother as sexually pure and selflessly nurturant. These imagoes mirror a patriarchal structure, associating men with intellect and domination or aggressive action, and women with bodily care and service.

Clearly, such imagoes not only derive from patriarchal structures, they contribute to the preservation of such structures as well. When manifest in ethical discussions, political actions, or social behaviors, they repeat and thus reinforce the patriarchal relations that gave rise to them initially. Movies and television shows, news programs, and magazine articles, moreover, all tacitly invoke these imagoes by, for example, contrasting the heartless businesswoman with the affectionate wife and mother—a recurrent structure in recent television and cinema, as Susan Faludi (1991) has stressed. In doing this, they not only foster consciously conformist beliefs and attitudes (say, those that condemn highly independent women) but also link these with powerful unconscious imagoes: the devouring mother and the nurturant mother, in this case. (Note that it is immaterial whether or not writers, directors, and producers are thinking in psychoanalytic terms when creating such works. All they need recognize is that a certain sort of opposition is particularly emotionally effective. Psychoanalytic theory may be necessary to explain *why* it is so effective, but no one needs psychoanalytic theory to see *that* it is effective, and thus to produce it.)

The activation of imagoes in these and other ways is consequential, for transference motivates, excites, and angers. People hold many beliefs about which they are relatively indifferent. There is no reason that this should not be the case with respect to some unscrupulous businesswomen and some loving wives out in the general populace or on television. Part of the reason people react to these characters is a matter of self-interest; part is a matter of narcissistic identification. A large part of the reason, though, is that people's maternal imagoes still carry with them deep, infantile, conflicted, irrational feelings of love and anger, satisfaction and frustration, and these unresolved feelings—along with related beliefs, identifica-

tions, and so on—enter into one's understanding of and response to the position of women and men in society, the sexual division of labor, and the like.

Transference relations have great relevance outside gender relations as well. For example, infantile imagoes played a significant role in the Gulf War. Through a range of outlets, the imago of the absolutely knowing, powerful, protecting father was associated with the U.S. government broadly, and at a certain point linked with Norman Schwarzkopf in particular, for whom many people evidenced a classic case of transference love. This was implicit in much of the war coverage, from the unquestioning attitude of the media concerning government pronouncements to their childlike wonder at smart bombs and patriot missiles.

In other contexts, rulers have sought to associate dominant figures with paternal or, less frequently, maternal imagoes. Walter Rodney (1972) reports an unusually explicit case of this: "As late as 1949, a Principal Education Officer in Tanganyika carefully outlined that the Africans of that colony should be bombarded in primary school with propaganda about the British royal family. 'The theme of the king as father should be stressed throughout the syllabus and mentioned in every lesson,' he said" (247). This was probably too overt and crude to have actually encouraged a transference, but the relation of the two is clear enough.

Indeed, this attitude of reverence for parental, usually paternal, authority is one of the most pervasive and debilitating effects of transference in politics. As I described it above, transference appeared to have no history, but to be a direct movement from infantile experiences to some current situation. That is not true. Each transference may recontextualize and reorient the original imago in such a way as to alter subsequent transferences. The child's idealized father imago derives from the social structure of the family. Early transferences involving this imago occur in school with teachers, in church with pastors, and in other hierarchical institutional settings. Repeated transferences of this sort encourage an association of the idealized father imago with individuals who have institutional authority, or even with institutional authority as such. This may operate not only to promote consensual beliefs about particular events or situations, such as the Gulf War, but also to encourage a more general trust in the authority of dominant groups, and thus, in the social structure as a whole. Moreover, due to the traumatic impotence of children when faced with parental rage,

transference may also, and simultaneously, foster an irrational fear of annihilating punishment for any form of nonconformity, exacerbating already strong tendencies in this regard.

A perhaps more obvious function of transference in the Gulf War was the negative transference onto Iraqis, and Saddam Hussein in particular. Hussein was not only dehumanized; he was repeatedly characterized in terms that encouraged an identification of him with the negative paternal imago of a violent brute and lascivious rapist—an imago already central to both antiblack and anti-Arab racism. In fact, he was implicitly characterized as a rapist of children, a particularly effective cue for the threatening oedipal imago. Some striking instances of this may be found in Bush's speech announcing the beginning of the war. (I am grateful to Marianne Sadowski for pointing this out.) Bush (1991) begins by characterizing Kuwait as a child, "small" and "helpless," that has been "crushed" and "brutalized." He goes on to contrast the "family of nations"—the phrase serves to trigger positive infantile associations—with Hussein's treatment of "tiny" (again, childlike) Kuwait, which "Saddam Hussein systematically raped." Bush further specifies Hussein's crimes as "unspeakable atrocities" against "innocent children"—an especially effective image, in context, if also one that is particularly obscene in its hypocrisy (recall the hundreds of thousands of innocent children killed because of the war and subsequent embargo [see, for example, Crossette 1995]).

More generally, the ingroup/outgroup division almost immediately draws positive transference to the hierarchical authorities of the former, and a negative transference to any prominent member of the latter—or in some cases, to any member of the latter whatsoever. Indeed, negative transference has long been seen as a primary element within racism, one of the most socially consequential forms of ingroup/outgroup division. The stereotype of the black man as absurdly sexually powerful and/or a rapist certainly fits well with the standard imago of the "phallic" father. The stereotype of the black woman as a prostitute aligns with one standard maternal imago as well—one maternal imago that would frequently be paired with the phallic father.

The transference need not stop at this rather generic level, though; it can become fully individual, too. In other words, racial stereotypes that trigger infantile imagoes may do more than yield broadly racist ideas and feelings. One's concrete relations with members of different racial groups may

become deeply bound up with one's own, idiosyncratic unconscious fantasies and psychoneurotic behaviors. Though still based on typological links of the sort just mentioned, this more fully individuated form of transference—which is to say, transference proper—takes up and particularizes these typological links according to unique, personal, infantile experience and fantasy.

Doris Lessing's (1976) *The Grass Is Singing* presents a useful illustration. In this novel, Mary, the protagonist, has an especially hateful relation to blacks. She constantly abuses her domestic servants, and at one point, whips one of the farmhands for what could at worst be considered a minor impoliteness when asking for a drink (134–35). Lessing implicitly explains this as a negative transference. Specifically, she unfolds Mary's hatred for her father, while continually drawing implicit parallels between Mary's relation to her father and the black servants. For example, Mary is disturbed by "the hot acrid scent of native bodies" (187); she "shudder[ed], as . . . she imagined that native smell" (188). Lessing makes it clear that this disgust—which focuses on a racist commonplace about African odor—has oedipal roots. It derives from Mary's father's disagreeable habit of pressing Mary's head into his lap and holding her face against his crotch: "She smelled the sickly odor of beer and through it she smelled too—her head held down in the thick stuff of his trousers—the unwashed masculine smell she always associated with him. She struggled to get her head free, for she was half-suffocating, and her father held it down, laughing at her panic" (190). Mary's wild and brutal reaction to the farmhand's request for a drink is similarly explained: Mary's greatest resentment against her father concerned precisely his drinking when he should have been working. In both cases, her transferential reaction to Africans is a specification of the typological link between blacks and the lascivious rapist imago—a link signaled by the society in which she grew up ("She was afraid of them, of course. Every woman in South Africa is brought up to be" [61]). But in each instance, this typological link has been developed—in Mary's imagination and in her transferential behavior—through specific oedipal fantasies and memories from her childhood.

Needless to say, such transferential connections are not confined to literature but extend through ordinary life, from personal interactions, to dreams and fantasies, to the onset and elaboration of neuroses and psychoses. The most famous treatments of the psychopathology of race rela-

tions are to be found in the writings of Frantz Fanon. For example, Fanon (1967) discusses the case of Mlle. B., who suffered from psychoneurotic “agitation, motor instability, tics, and spasms” (204), traceable to an unconscious “fear of imaginary Negroes” (208). A recent case, reported by Kathryn Russell (1998), is in some ways even more striking, for it illustrates a sort of hysterical delusion that is both fully individuated and yet also collective. In 1994, “a White Louisiana woman told police” that she had been raped by a black man with “a tattoo of a serpent on his arm”—a classic displacement of phallic potency through the image of the snake, combined with Satanic suggestions drawn from religious myth. What is striking about this case is that the woman “confessed that she had made up the rape story.” Nonetheless, when a police sketch was circulated in Baton Rouge, “twenty-eight other women notified the police that they too had been assaulted by the imaginary ‘serpent man’ ” (77). Even at its most individually psychopathological, the racialized imago is social in its operation and political in its function. In this instance, it was directly bound up with the legal system and police, and could easily have resulted in an arrest, even a conviction.

In conclusion, it is worth turning to another aspect of transference and the oedipal complex. Oedipal imagoes, as already noted, involve images of oneself just as they involve images of one’s parents. These self-imagoes, too, are ambivalent and multiple. Most obviously, there is the “innocent” ego, the good boy or girl whose acts, ideas, and feelings are all just what they should be, and the “guilty” ego—the ego who desires one parent and wants to kill the other, the ego that does things that are wrong and provokes his or her parents, the ego that brings on punishment, which is to say, threats of “castration” or annihilation. Indeed, children sometimes refer to themselves by two different names, explaining that a “naughty” act was done by “bad Billy” rather than “good Billy,” and sometimes even expressing the desire to be rid of their “bad” self entirely.

These imagoes can be transferred, or rather “projected,” onto others as well. This can be particularly dangerous, because the repudiation of the “bad” self-imago is often extreme and bound up with other pathological relations. For example, the person who most deeply fears annihilating punishment for nonconformity may also be the most vehement in demanding the annihilation of anyone else who violates the principles of the system even slightly. Perhaps the clearest case of this is homophobia. As

recent studies have demonstrated, a strong antipathy toward gay men is most often found among putatively heterosexual men who have strong homosexual impulses, but have repressed those impulses. The intensity of their malice toward gay men is a direct result of their own panic over being “bad” themselves (see Adams, Wright, and Lohr 1996). It seems apparent that the same sort of self-repudiation underlies many types of hierarchy-preserving, conformism-inducing hatred and aggression.