

FOUR *Cognitive Structure and the Example of Racism*

In the preceding chapter, I introduced some complex cognitive structures—schemas, prototypes, and exempla—that go beyond a folk psychology of beliefs and aims. Though I touched on schemas and prototypes, only exempla were treated in detail. In this final chapter, prototypes in particular will be considered more thoroughly, along with two further aspects of cognition: domains and models. But before going on to this, the organization of the mental lexicon needs to be examined.

LEXICAL STRUCTURE

Perhaps the first thing I should stress is that all the cognitive structures discussed here—and thus all concepts, vocabulary items, linguistic and conceptual principles, and so forth—exist only in individual people's minds. All humans may be understood to have a sort of internal "lexicon," something like a mental dictionary/encyclopedia. This internal lexicon is largely the same from person to person within any given social and linguistic community—otherwise, those people would not be able to communicate successfully. On the other hand, there will be some variation in the extent of conceptual differentiation (some people will, for example, distinguish more types of flowers), in the precise structuring and content of particular lexical entries (individuals will give slightly different definitions even to common terms), and so on.

This lexicon may be viewed as structured into clusters of conceptual and perceptual properties and relations, usually linked with words. Thus, each person has a cluster of properties linked with the word "cat" (animal, furry,

smallish, four-legged, pet, makes “meow” sound). These properties are ordered into a default hierarchy, with the most important properties listed at the “top.” Top-to-bottom order here refers not to a spatial arrangement but rather to definitional importance and order of access in cognition: “animal” is more essential than “furry”; “furry” is more crucial than “pet,” and so on. If a particular thing is not an animal but a vegetable, people know for certain that it is not a cat; if it is bald, people are likely to doubt that it is a cat, but they will not be certain from that fact alone; if it is not a pet, people are unlikely to see this as providing a good reason for doubting its catness.

On the other hand, if it is not a pet, it is likely to be seen as a less prototypical cat. As noted in the preceding chapter, lexical entries are not only hierarchized but also structured into defaults. The default conception of a cat includes “pet.” Defaults may be overridden, often for specified alternatives—in this case, “stray cat” or “alley cat.” The more defaults that are in place, the closer the cat in question is to a prototypical cat.

Within the default hierarchy, there appear to be several subclasses of information. Thus people probably distinguish the subcluster “common beliefs about” for any lexical entry. Common beliefs about cats would include, for example, “disloyal” and “sneaky.” Such common beliefs are always candidates for inclusion in the main attributive subdirectory of the entry for the lexical item at hand. By “main attributive subdirectory,” I mean the part of one’s lexical entry listing properties that one implicitly attributes to cats. While I may currently have no opinion about whether or not cats are disloyal and sneaky, I may in the future see a cat behave in a certain way that leads me to conclude that this common belief is, in fact, correct. Since these common beliefs are stored in my lexical entry for cats, they are always in some degree cognitively present when I see, respond to, or think about cats. They are always open to access and inclusion in the main attributive subdirectory. They are, indeed, always available for use in understanding cats, even if I never incorporate them into the main attributive subdirectory. Put differently, the structure of the human mind is such that standard, communal beliefs on any given topic (such as cats) are always readily available to me for understanding that topic, even if I do not accept those beliefs myself.

This cognitive tendency has directly consensual and conformist effects. It seems likely that everyone in the United States, whether white or black,

has a category of “common beliefs about” blacks in their lexical entry for “black.” This category might include, for example, “lazy.” Thus, even for those who have not incorporated this property into the main attributive subdirectory of their entry (that is, even for those who do not believe that blacks are lazy), the property is always somewhere in the lexical entry, ready to be accessed and applied. This would not be a problem in and of itself were it not for the cognitive tendency toward confirmatory bias, a tendency exacerbated by the likelihood that any confirmatory instance will be more salient in this case than a disconfirmatory one. In other words, any person not doing his or her work is likely to be more salient than any number of persons doing their work—a point that does not affect whites as there is no relevant lexicalized property that might be accessed to categorize them as “lazy.” As such, the mere presence of common beliefs about blacks—or Asians, gay men, or whatever—will exert a sort of ideological pressure on an understanding of and response to people and situations, even when those beliefs are repudiated. The sort of discrepancies discussed by Nisbett and Ross—where a white man on a park bench is interpreted one way and a black man another—can result even when people do not precisely hold the racist beliefs in question. The mere knowledge of a common racist belief that blacks are lazy may be enough to push a person’s interpretation in that direction in any particular case.

Note that the same thing holds for, say, war, socialism, or any other ideologically consequential concern. The common belief that leftists are totalitarians (or that they fall into two categories, totalitarians and dreamy utopianists) is always open to access, and “confirmation,” when one encounters a single leftist whose behavior, though perhaps merely abrasive, may be interpreted as totalitarian.

Other subdirectories of lexical structure might include “ideal” and related evaluative categories. The structure and genesis of these categories is more complex than might initially be evident. For example, as I am using the term, the “ideal” subdirectory of a lexical entry is not generated individually. Indeed, it is distinguishable from a “personal preference” subcategory. “Ideal,” here, is social. Moreover, it is distinguishable not only from personal preference but also from “common preference” in society at large. The “ideal” wine, in my lexicon, may not be the wine I personally prefer or I take to be most commonly preferred in the United States but the wine preferred by a particular group, “experts.”

As Hilary Putnam (1975) has stressed (in a nonpolitical context), many lexical entries involve a key reference to expertise. My entry for “quark,” for example, runs something like this: “Perhaps indivisible constituent of protons, etc.; for precise meaning, consult particle physicist aware of current developments.” Even “cat” includes something along the lines of “exact delimitation provided by zoologists.” Ideals are regularly defined by expertise. In some instances, this is directly parallel to the descriptive cases just mentioned and a matter of scientific expertise—as in, say, the “(ideal) cholesterol level.” Here, one often has no distinct categories for personal or social preference. Other instances, however, are not categorized as scientific knowledge but as taste. These too involve reference to experts, but in these cases ideal and personal preference subcategories are far more likely to diverge.

Indeed, in these cases, it makes more sense to distinguish “common preference” and “prestige” subdirectories. It could then be said that when the prestige category is assumed to be objective (most obviously, when it is assumed to rest on scientific knowledge, as in the example of cholesterol levels), then it is an ideal. As Pierre Bourdieu (1984) has argued at length, what I am calling the prestige sub-category derives largely from common preference within a social and cultural elite (much as the ideal subcategory derives largely from a scientific elite). The prestige wine is the wine preferred by that elite; the prestige music is the music preferred by that elite, and so on. Bourdieu’s researches primarily concern class differences within European (specifically French) society. The point, however, applies equally to colonialist, racist, and other forms of hierarchy. In each case, the prestige category is a function of the preferences of the dominant group.

The effect of this is obvious. The cultural ideas, beliefs, and practices of the subordinated group are demeaned. The elite themselves come to be viewed as more discriminating, more insightful, etc.—circularly. Their preferences define prestige; preference for prestige items implies discrimination or “good taste”; thus their preference proves their discrimination. Note that this is true even for those who self-consciously reject the prestige standard. Much as common beliefs are always present in one’s lexical entries, available for access and application, so too are prestige standards. Even if a black nationalist affirms black culture, the (repudiated) white prestige standard is always there, exerting the pressure of a social belief, reinforced by confirmatory bias.

As the last example indicates, it is not merely the origin but the content of prestige standards that is consequential. Some striking instances of particular prestige standards with consensual and conformist results may be found in beauty. Consider the image of female beauty that has been widely if tacitly disseminated by the fashion and diet industries in recent decades, and that has proven deeply important for women's self-understanding and behavior. Susan Faludi (1991) has argued powerfully that in recent years, the fashion industry, entertainment industry, and beauty and women's magazines have projected a model of feminine beauty defined by "frailty, pallor, puerility" (203). The debilitating effects of this prestige standard are not only indirect—inhibition, loss of self-esteem, etc.; they are brutally direct as well. "Antiwrinkle treatments exposed [women] to carcinogens. Acid face peels burned their skin. Silicone injections left painful deformities. 'Cosmetic' liposuction caused severe complications, infections, and even death. Internalized, the decade's beauty dictates played a role in exacerbating an epidemic of eating disorders" (ibid.). Plastic surgery drained women's resources. One survey "by a plastic surgery association found that about half their patients made less than \$25,000 a year; these women took out loans and even mortgaged homes to pay the surgery bill" (218). And this is not an insignificant group of people. The number of women with breast implants alone numbers in the millions (ibid.).

Moreover, at an ideological level, advertisements and magazine articles repeatedly contrast beauty with work. Faludi cites "ad after ad" in which "the beauty industry hammered home its version of the backlash thesis: women's professional progress had downgraded their looks; equality had created worry lines and cellulite" (202). *Mademoiselle*, for one, warned that work can "play havoc with your complexion," lead to a "loss of hair," and result in "weight gain," especially for "high-achieving women" (ibid.).

As all this illustrates, the prestige standard of appearance affects women most obviously. Yet it also affects minorities—as is made clear by the array of hair-straightening and skin-whitening products, so widespread in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the origin of rhinoplasty ("nose jobs") was racist. It was first used to "cure" people of "Irish" pug noses and reduce the "Semitic" appearance of Jews (Gilman 1991, 184 ff.). The racialism has hardly disappeared. Faludi (1991) reports a public lecture by plastic surgeon Robert Harvey (San Francisco's "leading breast enlarge-

ment surgeon”): “The first set of slides are almost all photos of Asian women whose features he has Occidentalized—making them, in Harvey’s opinion, ‘more feminine’ ” (214).

These sorts of prestige standards plainly have debilitating, and thus consensual, effects. One might argue, however, that it is the fault of the people who accept this standard. If they rejected it, the standard would not have the same impact. This is partially true, but it ignores two essential points. The first is something I have already stressed. No one need accept a prestige standard for it to have significant consequences for their self-esteem, interactions with other people, and so forth. Its mere presence in the lexical entry has consequences in these areas. Second, the prestige standards of beauty are socially functionalized; they have real, direct outcomes for social well-being. Most obviously, they affect one’s social life, and one’s social life plays a crucial role not only in personal happiness but material security. In addition, they often enter directly into whether one is hired for a job or promoted once employed. This is clearly true of jobs that involve some direct focus on appearance (such as actors or spokespersons). Yet it is true elsewhere as well. Peter Passell (1994) remarks that “new studies show that men and women . . . who are rated below average in attractiveness by survey interviewers typically earn 10 to 20 percent less than those rated above average.” Given the nature of the prestige standards, which are more extreme and socially valued for women than men, it is not surprising that “obese women” are perhaps the most severely affected. They “lived in households with, on average, \$6,700 less in yearly income” (*ibid.*).

It is worth noting in this context that evaluative preferences may have consensual and conformist effects independent of elite derivation, ideological manipulation, etc. Spontaneous personal preference regarding appearance, for example, is likely to favor majorities over minorities and elites over nonelites. Simply put, other things being equal, judgments of beauty tend toward the statistical mean. The most beautiful face is the most average face (see Langlois and Roggman 1990). Distinctive features of any group, then, will have an effect on preferences relative to their number—or more exactly, to their visibility. Visibility is related to number, although it is not solely a function of it. If members of a minority group—such as white South Africans—are overrepresented in the media, then their distinctive

features will have proportionately greater pull on the determination of judgments of beauty. Needless to say, the opulent few, or at least members of the same ingroups as the opulent few, tend to be the ones with disproportionately high visibility (for instance, on the overrepresentation of blond hair among women cover models and centerfolds, see Rich and Cash 1993). If blacks are a small, nonelite minority and whites are a large majority, comprising the elite, then the spontaneous preference of most people regarding skin color and beauty may be slightly darker than that of whites in general, but will certainly be far lighter than that of blacks in general. In short, it will greatly favor whites over blacks.

The situation is only worsened by the fact that any given prestige category may be linked with many other admired or ideal properties. Specifically, various types of ideals and prestige standards tend to cluster together in people's lexicons, almost to the point of mutual identification. This is probably due to their common presence in some sort of idealized prototype person. But this clustering is not confined to an idealized prototype; crucially, it spreads to real cases—real cases based at least in part on status in social hierarchies.

Consider, for example, one study in which a researcher played tapes of different Cockney and prestige-accent English voices to test subjects, then asked these subjects to grade the speakers on “friendliness, intelligence, kindness, ‘hard-workingness,’ good looks, cleanliness and honesty.” He found that the “Cockney voices receiv[ed] *negative* evaluations for virtually every scale, and the standard-accented voices *positive* ones,” even for subjects who were themselves Cockney speakers (Hudson 1980, 204). In other words, lower-class English people associated ideal personality characteristics with the prestige-accent category and not with their own ingroup, which presumably defined their own preference category (at least in terms of social interaction, etc.). This study, of course, may merely indicate that Cockney speakers decided to give the “right” answer—the socially accepted one—to this question, despite their own views being different. But even if this is the case, the study still shows that the effect of prestige categorization is strong, and that logically unrelated properties—intelligence, kindness, good looks, and so on—tend to cluster together and be attributed collectively to high-status individuals. It should be clear that this has consensual or conformist consequences.

PROTOTYPES

I noted above that the schema is structured into a default hierarchy and the prototype is the result of putting all the defaults in place. Yet this is only partly true. While one set of defaults in a schema defines one prototype, for any given lexical item, there may be a series of prototypes, which are themselves arranged in a default hierarchy. Indeed, the example of the pet cat and stray cat indicates just this. The pet cat is the default prototype for “cat.” But there are distinct prototypes for “pet cat” and “stray cat.” For instance, perceptually, a stray cat has matted or patchy hair, no collar, a thin body, etc. This is important because precisely the same sort of hierarchizing of prototypes occurs in some politically consequential areas, most obviously racism.

What people call stereotypes are largely a subset of prototypes; however, there are some stereotypes that would not count as prototypical. Specifically, a stereotype is a set of properties that is attributed to members of a particular ethnic group. A prototype is a set of properties that is automatically triggered when a particular lexical item is accessed. The prototype is overridden (perhaps replaced by another prototype) only in special circumstances. Again, the prototype is the default. When a stereotype is a default, then it is a prototype; some stereotypes, however, are not defaults. Rather than being triggered automatically, and overcome only in special circumstances, they are triggered only in special circumstances.

To rephrase it, there is a difference between functionalized and nonfunctionalized stereotypes. There are stereotypes about almost every group in the world, but most of these are not socially functionalized—or essentialized, which is to say, generalized as relevant in all contexts. For example, there are stereotypes about Swedish, German, and French women. In terms of social consequences, though, these are not in any way comparable to, say, stereotypes about black women. Socially, the difference is between functionalized and nonfunctionalized stereotypes, stereotypes that operate to define widespread social hierarchies and stereotypes that do not. In terms of the formal operation of human cognition, this difference seems to be largely a matter of “context-bound access” versus “context-free access,” that is, nonprototypical stereotypes versus prototypical ones. While various stereotypes about Germans exist (for instance, that they are totalitarians), outside a small group of people who particularly dislike or distrust Germans—and for whom the stereotype is, in effect, socially functionalized—it

seems unlikely that any of these stereotypes is the default understanding of a German. Rather, special circumstances are needed in order for this stereotype to be triggered. Suppose Jones is introduced to Helmholtz. It is unlikely that Jones will activate anything that could be referred to as a “stereotype.” He or she will, of course, activate a prototype, which includes such properties as “speaks German.” But imagine Helmholtz becomes extremely stern and orders Jones to do things when they are supposedly collaborating on some project. Jones may then activate the Nazi stereotype. This contrasts rather sharply with the way in which antiblack, anti-Jewish, or sexist stereotypes operate. In each of these cases, some stereotype is likely to be accessed right at the outset, as the default prototype. Once activated, moreover, it is likely to be far more tenacious, to trigger confirmatory bias, and so on.

One way of understanding this difference is in terms of prototypical humanness, as discussed in the preceding chapter. White people, whatever their national origin, are first of all understood as human (at least by other white people, but also to some extent by nonwhites, as noted earlier). In other words, they first of all trigger the “human” prototype. This may be conceived of as “augmentable” by regional characteristics. For example, the prototypical human would include such underspecified properties as “speaks prototypical human language,” with such European languages as English, German, and French available for insertion. Put differently, insofar as ethnic characteristics enter, they do so within an encompassing, human prototype (much as differences between robins and sparrows enter under an encompassing “bird” prototype). It is only under special circumstances that a German, for example, would be shifted out of the human prototype to some ethnic prototype. For blacks, however, the process is precisely the reverse (much as it is for an ostrich or a penguin relative to the bird prototype). It may be possible for a white person eventually to understand an individual black in relation to the human prototype, as specific (humanizing) information displaces stereotype properties (see Holland et al. 1987, 219, 221), but the process begins with the stereotypical properties.

The point may be illustrated by considering the Oklahoma City bombing. As in any case of this sort, investigators were rightly concerned with individuals seen at or near the building that day. One report explained that people had seen several men in Arab dress present there. The implication was obvious: these Arabs may have been responsible. Needless to say, no

one remarked on the fact that far more people wearing Western clothing were seen at the building. This is partly a matter of saliency. Yet it is also a matter of the way prototype triggering operates differently in these two instances. In the case of the Arabs, the first prototype triggered is ethnic and includes such properties as “terrorist.” As for the European-Americans, the first prototype triggered is “human.” (Despite the fact that over the last two centuries, Europeans have far outpaced all other groups in human slaughter. Statistically speaking, when innocent people die, the default suspects should be white.)

As already indicated, even socially functionalized prototypes or stereotypes are not singular. There are often several distinct prototypes for any given outgroup (compare Hamilton and Troler 1986, 139). These, too, may be arranged in a default hierarchy or may be a function of other variables beyond the one that defines the ingroup/outgroup division. The most important variables of the latter sort appear to be categories that themselves define consequential ingroup/outgroup divisions: age, sex, and economic status. Consider black prototypes. Clearly, these differ for children, adults, and elderly persons, men and women, rich and poor. The adult black man, for one, falls into a small number of prototypes, the most prominent of which are probably athlete/entertainer, street criminal, and unemployed loafer, with all three marked by a high degree of sexual activity—if positive, high sexual abilities; if negative, sexual aggressiveness tending toward rape. The adult black woman also falls into a small number of prototypes, prominently prostitute and welfare mother, but also something along the lines of an aggressive professional advanced due to pugnacity and affirmative action. The most common prototype for the older, postsexual black woman appears to be the competent, stern grandmother. Note that each of these prototypes includes defaults as well. For example, the default “family life” for the welfare mother is “abandoned by (irresponsible) black lover, to whom she was not married.” (I am drawing primarily on my own personal sense of common prototypes. This delimitation is, therefore, highly tentative and needs to be replaced by more accurate formulations based on empirical research. Currently, however, such research is sparse—as Hamilton and Troler [1986, 137] have stressed.)

What seems to happen in stereotypical thinking is something along the following lines. Jones, who is white, sees a black person, Smith. That

person's sex, age, and apparent economic status serve as "probes" to isolate the relevant prototype from Jones's lexicon. If Smith is an older black woman, his tendency may be to assume that she is a stern grandmother. If Smith is a young black man, casually dressed, sitting on a park bench, his tendency may be to assume that Smith is irresponsible and has lost his job. These prototypes exert pressure on Jones's understanding of and response to Smith, even after he gains individuating and stereotype-falsifying information about Smith (say, that Smith is well employed, but has the day off).

One thing that must be stressed about all this is that it is in no way dependent on self-conscious beliefs. It took considerable psychological research and theorization to posit and define prototypes. They are not immediately evident via introspection. Their operation is almost entirely nonconscious. But they are central to any understanding of the world. Who would say that they believe birds are robins? No one. But in looking at birds, one's mind first of all refers them to robins (and a few other prototypical birds) for comparison. The same sort of thing happens with people.

LEXICAL TOPICALIZATION AND MOOD

Thus far it has been assumed that the information included in any lexical entry in the mind is fully specified in terms of content, attitude, and the like, yet this may not in fact be the case. It may be that schemas first of all include some focal topic, which is then specifiable in terms of a series of variables. The same holds for prototypes and even exempla. For instance, the prototype for "Jew" may include some topicalizing element along the lines of "money." This topicalization may be specified into "greedy and cheating" or "good at business," depending on shifts in attitude. Similarly, "woman" might include the topicalizing element "feeding." This has a number of consequences, most via other topicalizing elements. With a second topicalizing element, "child care," it is linked to breast-feeding and other maternal activities, as well as oedipal imagoes. With a different second element, "housewife," it is linked to spousal duties, such as cooking—but also, perhaps, to providing emotional "nurturance."

There are several outcomes of this analysis. First, it indicates that any given individual may vary in his or her attitude toward a particular group (say, Jews), or have different attitudes toward individual members of that

group, while consistently maintaining a coherent, underlying (stereotypical) view of that group and its members as a whole. In addition, emotive attitudes toward a group or its members may be highly unstable. A positive attitude toward group members, then, does not in any way point to an absence of prejudice. Indeed, it is likely to indicate only a temporarily benevolent attitude. As a result, any positive attitude may readily shift into a negative one, with the underlying representational content of the two (diametrically opposed) attitudes remaining substantially the same. John H. Duckitt (1992) backs this up: a “positive outgroup stereotype can shift rapidly and easily to become extremely negative with a change in circumstances” (157). Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) make the same general point as well, explaining that Mary may like John when she links him with her “scholar” prototype and dislike John when she links him with her “pedant” prototype (160). Here too the representational content hardly varies, but the feelings are contradictory. One implication of this is that an ideological “critique” that sets out merely to elevate a positive attitude over a negative one (for example, that women are “nurturant,” not “devouring”) is likely to do nothing more than reinforce the shared stereotypical content of the two attitudes, thereby worsening the racism or sexism it was intended to undermine.

It is worth noting that attitudinal shifts of this sort may be a matter of broader subjective well-being, with no initial bearing on the object-group in question. Studies by Esses, Haddock, and Zanna (1994) indicate that mood may be an important determinant of the way in which people specify stereotype characteristics. “When people are in a negative mood, they are likely to interpret their stereotypes of certain groups in a particularly unfavorable light” (98). Conversely, “satisfaction with self [is] associated with more positive ethnic attitudes” (Duckitt 1992, 172). This implies that part of the virulence of racism during certain periods has nothing to do with the people who are the object of that racism, not even with the racist’s initial imagination of those people. In other words, it is often assumed that an increase in antiblack racism must be founded on something relating to blacks—their negative portrayal in films or television, a prejudicial use of crime statistics by prominent politicians, or a demagogue’s appeal to white self-interest in a tightening economy. All these things are, of course, relevant; however, it seems that a significant part of the virulence of a person’s racist beliefs is simply a function of his or her independent sense of well-

being. The worse one feels, for whatever reason, the more likely one is to adopt hateful versions of stereotypes.

This is one of the reasons why panic tends to foster racism, authoritarianism, and more generally, consent and conformism—a point that is deeply consequential for U.S. society today. As Susan Douglas (1997a) has maintained, the news media are largely driven by the dictum, “If it bleeds, it leads,” and are filled with sensationalistic stories of crime and disaster. This “body-bag journalism bludgeons the viewer into a state of cynicism, resignation, and fear.” These “sentiments . . . serve a conservative agenda,” at least in part, because they lead people to shift from positive to negative attitudes in their beliefs or prototypes. This is most obvious in the case of race, but it applies to a wide range of social phenomena. Everything from places to institutions to people are conceived of via topics inflected by attitudes. As attitudes in general become bleaker, people are more likely to shift to negative specifications of topics across the board. Douglas argues that “the more TV you watch, the more inclined you are to exaggerate the level of crime in society, and to exaggerate your own vulnerability to crime.” In consequence, “people who watch a lot of TV are much more likely to favor punitive approaches to crime—such as building more prisons and extending the death penalty—than are light viewers.” Presumably, part of what is going on here is that panic leads people to specify crime-related topics in the most negative and dehumanizing way. This, in turn, leads to the advocacy of the harshest and most authoritarian responses. (For a summary of research linking authoritarian convictions to fear of a hostile world, see Duckitt 1992, 207 ff.)

Suppose one topic for “criminals” is “illness,” for example. In a positive mood, one might envision an emotionally tortured man or woman, overcome by mental illness as if by some alien force, committing a crime against his or her will; one might even imagine the origins of this illness in his or her own suffering and mistreatment as a child. One might then respond to this by attempting to cure the illness, thereby viewing the response to crime as “treatment” or “rehabilitation.” In contrast, in a negative mood, one might conceive of the criminal as akin to a rabid animal, totally overcome by disease, with no separate and human consciousness—incurable, dangerous, contagious, with all that this implies for punitive response. The two views share a common topicalization, differing primarily in emotional attitude.

DOMAINS

Beyond single lexical entries and their internal structure, relations among entries—especially those relations defined by lexical domains—are crucial for consent as well. A domain (sometimes called a “semantic field”) is a set of linked or coordinated lexical items such that each item in the domain is partially defined by reference to all the others, often by way of some superordinate term. “Monday,” “Tuesday,” and so forth, for instance, all fall into the domain of days of the week. Likewise, the domain of intelligence might run from “stupid” through “brilliant”—to take a looser scale of degrees, rather than a fully specified set of discrete elements. (Precisely how such a domain is defined will vary from idiolect to idiolect, from person to person.)

The most obvious relevance of domains to an understanding of ideology comes in the definition of problematics. Take the domain “types of government.” It seems that most people in the United States tacitly define this domain by reference to two subdomains: totalitarianism and capitalism/democracy. This domain underlies and permits the standard problematic regarding socialism as a form of totalitarianism.

Such a literal or direct operation of domains is, however, not the only way in which these structures bear on ideology. In fact, the metaphorical use of domains is as significant and widespread, if not more so. One of the most common cognitive processes is the mapping of one domain onto another, such that the first serves as a way of structuring and understanding the second. (The most famous discussions of this general phenomenon are by Lakoff and Johnson 1980, and Lakoff and Turner 1989; the following analysis is indebted to their work.) This is “cognitive modeling,” and it is perhaps the most consequential way in which domains enter into the generation of consent.

The division of society into ingroups and outgroups, as discussed above, often involves an identification of the ingroup with “human” and the outgroup with “nonhuman.” At the very least, it involves identifying members of the ingroup as more prototypically human than members of the outgroup. This is particularly the case when the groups in question are defined and hierarchized by putative essences. Borrowing a term from Max Weber, I will refer to ingroup/outgroup sets of this sort as “status groups,” sometimes referring to the putative essences as “status categories.” (For We-

ber's definition, see Weber 1968, 932; for discussion, see Wallerstein in Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 187–203.)

Status groups involve a sort of ideological contradiction, and thus create a problem for the dominant ideology. The members of status groups are all human, yet some are less human than others or not human at all. Status groups must, by definition, fall within a common domain, “human.” But status group stratification contradicts such commonality. Status groups cannot be understood—and differentiated—on the basis of shared properties, nor can status group hierarchies be justified on that basis. For example, if whites are to be owners and blacks are to be slaves, and if there is to be widespread consent to this stratification, then “black” and “white” cannot simply be perceived as alternatives within the domain of “human.” If men are to be doctors or business executives and women are to be nurses or housewives, and if there is to be broad consent to this stratification, then “man” and “woman” cannot simply be alternatives within the domain of “human.” The schemas and prototypes of “black” and “white,” “man” and “woman,” cannot be defined primarily through their shared, human properties.

Now, if blacks (or Jews, gays, or women) are not seen primarily as instances of *human*, they must be understood by reference to some other lexical structures that in addition relate the oppressed group to the oppressor in an appropriate way, in keeping with social stratification. That is, these various structures must form a more encompassing domain, which includes the domain of the human as one part—for the dominant group (white, male, straight, or whatever) must occupy the definitive “human” position in that more encompassing domain. There have been two major domains on which elites have drawn in this way: maturity and animacy. These domains have been used to model status groups both cross-culturally and transhistorically. They are no less prominent today than they were in the past, and they function no less crucially in defining and sustaining social and political stratification.

The domain of maturity is defined by a scale running from childhood through adulthood to old age. The domain of animacy is defined by a scale running from the animal through the human to the angelic/demonic (or superhuman). Each position in the scale provides a potential model for any given status group, with the center point or “standard” reserved for the

dominant group. In keeping with the preceding discussion of attitude and topic in group bias, each model involves a negative and positive version. There are, for example, distinct negative and positive models drawn from childhood. Finally, while in principle anyone might adopt any of these models, there is a tendency for particular models to be associated with particular political orientations. Thus, the maturity domain as a whole tends to be the province of liberals, while the animacy domain is standard in right-wing or “conservative” thought.

Before going on to explore these domains in detail, it is worth remarking on the special place of women in status group modeling. In every society of which I am aware, the oppression of women is of the longest standing historically. As such, it is the most fundamental ideologically. The division into male and female is, in a sense, basic to the determination of hierarchized status groups; for instance, it precedes and provides a precedent for racial divisions, as Ashis Nandy has studied in detail (see 1983, 4–11, and 1987, 38). It is similar to these other divisions in that it, too, is regularly modeled on schemas and prototypes drawn from the domains of maturity and spirituality. Nevertheless, it is different in that it often enters into the modeling of those other divisions as well. When colonized people are assimilated to children, to cite one case, they are often simultaneously conceived of as feminine, due it seems to the prior assimilation of women to children. While I will not go into this at any length in what follows, it is important to recognize that the relation between a given model and status group (such as children and Africans) may be mediated by the more long-standing relation between that model and the status group of women.

THE DOMAIN OF MATURITY

The less extreme, and thus less destructive, of the two domains is that of maturity, which as already noted, encompasses models of childhood, adulthood, and old age. (In isolating and examining this domain, I have drawn heavily on Ashis Nandy’s pathbreaking study of colonialism, *The Intimate Enemy* [1983, 11–18].) Adulthood is, of course, the standard by which the others are measured, and it is the model for the dominant group. Again, there are attitudinal divisions in the remaining groups; these correspond to further age gradations. Specifically, the *childhood* model is regularly split into the “innocent prepubescent,” who requires loving guidance, and the “delinquent adolescent,” who requires firm discipline. Old

Figure 1. Maturity

PREPUBESCENT	WISE ELDER
Innocent, asexual or presexual, naive, intellectually limited, no internalized morality but open to guidance, playful, friendly, cute, chattering	Wise, asexual or postsexual, above both morality and instinct, supramundane, antilogical, recondite or silent, benevolent
Africans, women	Asians, women, peasants
Benevolent paternalism	Romantic exclusion
“Soft” or ideological liberalism	Romantic liberalism
ADULT	
ADOLESCENT	SENILE DECADENT
Scheming, compulsively sexual, intellectually limited (though less so), in rebellion against guiding parental morality, aggressive, unfriendly, inscrutably silent, ugly or powerfully sexual	Sexually desiccated, feeble, sly, perverse, physically exhausted, mentally dull, noncontagiously ill, isolated, illogical, incoherent, rambling, malevolent
Asians, Africans, women, workers	Asians, Arabs, aristocrats
Punitive paternalism	Telic exclusion
“Tough” or pragmatic liberalism	Revolutionary liberalism

age is likewise divided into what might be called “the wise elder” and “the senile decadent.” (For a tabulation of properties, most common status groups, and associated political views for all models of both domains, see figures 1 and 2.)

The infantile model yields a conception of a status group that is asexual or presexual, naive, intellectually limited to basic studies, lacking an internalized morality yet fundamentally good-natured and thus inclined to follow parental guidance, playful and friendly, chattering, and cute. The adolescent model, in contrast, is highly and compulsively sexual, clever or cunning, still intellectually limited (though somewhat less so), actively rebellious against parental authority and morality, aggressive and unfriendly, inscrutably silent, and either ugly or powerfully sexually attractive.

It is not difficult to see that the former is one of the most persistent models for women in our culture. It leads to the conception of women as pure and fragile girls capable of some education in the simpler and more

humanistic areas, but easily overtaxed by mental labor; lacking an autonomous superego (as stressed by Freud), although open to the guidance of a father or husband; and so on. Indeed, whole areas of today's culture, from codes of chivalry to matters of etiquette, are closely linked with this notion of women.

But women are not the only status group assimilated to prepubescent children. As Nandy has pointed out, "What was childlikeness of the child and childishness of the immature adults now also became the lovable and unlovable savagery of primitives and the primitivism of subject [that is, colonized] societies" (1983, 15–16); "The culture of the colonizer became the prototype of a mature, complete, adult civilization while the colonized became the mirror of a more simple, primitive, childlike cultural state" (1987, 38). This is the view of Africans as happy, banjo-playing folk, apt for a grade school education only (compare Rodney 1972, 243), friendly and loquacious. The prominent nineteenth-century naturalist Louis Agassiz, for one, maintained that blacks are "indolent, playful . . . imitative, subservient, good natured, versatile, unsteady in their purpose, devoted, affectionate," and thus, "may but be compared to children" (quoted in Gould 1981, 48). Putting the matter and its consequences more bluntly, Cecil Rhodes insisted that "the native is to be treated as a child and denied franchise" (quoted in Nandy 1987, 58).

These are not, of course, the only views of women and Africans as children. In times of peaceable relations, blacks may be readily conceived of as innocents; in periods of rebellion, this is more difficult. The same is true of women. As already noted, attitudes toward outgroups alter drastically with circumstances. John H. Duckitt (1992) remarks that "to the extent that members of the subordinate group accept their inferiority and respectfully acquiesce in their oppression, members of the dominant group may experience positive affect toward them" (101). But relations are not always so irenic. When the childhood model is invoked in less harmonious times, which is to say, with a negative attitude, these groups are assimilated to adolescents.

Before going on, it is worth stopping for a moment to consider the stereotyping of adolescents in contemporary society. As one recent study of "Media Myths about Teenagers" put it, adolescents are themselves misperceived as "violent, reckless, hypersexed . . . obnoxious, ignorant" (Males 1994, 8), to which could be added sullen, devious, and other characteris-

tics. Unsurprisingly, adolescents—like women and blacks—are far more likely to be the victims than the perpetrators of violence and sexual abuse, as Mike Males demonstrates. They are, moreover, disproportionately punished. Males and Faye Docuyan (1996) report that “in California, studies by the state corrections department show that youths serve sentences 60 percent longer than adults for the same crimes” (24). In short, this “adolescent” model has little relation to adolescents themselves, and is rather a reflection of the denigratory ideology that accompanies the parent/child hierarchy in society.

There are many instances of the use of adolescence as a model for essentialized outgroups. The unconstrained sexuality of women, their immorality, their wiles and inscrutability—so tirelessly stressed in misogynist literature—are all linked with this model. Even more obviously, blacks are frequently assimilated to delinquents. Hence, referring primarily to blacks, G. Stanley Hall, the most prominent psychologist in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, wrote that “most savages in most respects are children or . . . more properly, adolescents” (quoted in Gould 1981, 116). Asians are the racial group most consistently understood historically in terms of adolescence—from their decadent sensual luxuriance to their amorality and legendary inscrutability. As Stephen Gould (1981) observes, a number of thinkers have been completely explicit about identifying different categories of adult nonwhites with different categories of white youth. Étienne Serres, a famous French medical anatomist, saw adult blacks as comparable to white children and adult Mongolians as comparable to white adolescents (*ibid.*, 40). The Irish, too, have been regularly understood in these terms. For example, this view was repeatedly articulated by John Milton, who defended the domination of Ireland, including Cromwell’s brutal policies, in part by reference to the parental duties of English civilization (see *ibid.*, 663–64).

The innocent, infantile model dictates loving guidance, generosity, and compassion. The well-known nineteenth-century naturalist John Bachman wrote: “In intellectual power the African is an inferior variety of our species. His whole history affords evidence that he is incapable of self-government. Our child that we lead by the hand, and who looks to us for protection and support is still of our own blood notwithstanding his weakness and ignorance” (quoted in *ibid.*, 70). The adolescent model, in contrast, counsels unbending discipline, stringency, and authoritarianism—

“tough love” as it might be called now. The infantile model leads to “benevolent paternalism” and is most often employed by “soft” or ideological liberals (those who claim to place liberal principles above utilitarian concerns). The adolescent model, on the other hand, leads to a form of “punitive paternalism” and is the standard model for “tough” or pragmatic liberalism (which allows liberal principle to be qualified by practical concerns). Though the rhetoric and certain specific beliefs have changed over a hundred years, the use of both models regarding minorities and women remains widespread, if usually somewhat more covert, as will be seen in the discussion of Alan Paton below.

At the other end of the domain of maturity, one finds the models of wise elder and senile decadent. The former characterizes members of a target status group as asexual or postsexual. Neither driven by instinct nor governed by a legalistic morality, they have transcended both, and have achieved a sort of wisdom that goes beyond mechanical and pragmatic social ethics. They are isolated from society, not due to a rebellious and anarchic temperament but rather to a disinterested distance from the quotidian and mundane, a distance that allows them to maintain a state of serenity. They have achieved understanding that goes beyond both practical life and mere reason—indeed, they are often entirely nonlogical, and thus all the more profound. Most often, they are physically undeveloped, and either silent or brilliantly, if perhaps incomprehensibly, loquacious.

The senile model draws on many of the same themes, with the attitude and evaluative presuppositions changed. In this case, members of the target status group are sexually desiccated, capable only of feeble, perverse excitement. Their physical exhaustion and mental torpor remove them from both instinct and morality, though they seek the regeneration of normal adult instinct through twisted means. They are isolated from society in a dull-witted indifference. They say nothing, or ramble incoherently, lacking logical capacities.

The most obvious and common use of both models is for Asians. As, for example, Nandy has shown, Indian society was regularly viewed as “senile and decrepit” by British colonizers (1987, 39), and the idea of declining age was frequently projected onto Indians themselves (see 1983, 17–18), all in the service of the colonial project. While Nandy does not detail the particulars of this projection, they are nonetheless clear. In its negative version, the Indian or other easterner—including, in this case, Arabs—is viewed as

typically irrational and torpid, incapable of raising him or herself from mindless drudgery, except when seeking feeble gratification in decadent Eastern practices, such as pederasty (on the putative “lechery, debauchery, sodomy” of Arabs, see Said 1978, 62).

More generally, this negative model takes part in a telic emplotment of history in which the dominant group mythicizes its own political and economic ascendancy—“Asians were dominant at the dawn of time, but now they are declined into the vale of years, while we Europeans are young and vigorous; the burden of bringing civilization to its culminating perfection is on our shoulders,” and so forth. (On the notion of telic emplotment, see Hogan 1990, 47–49.) This model, then, is not only invoked by the British in India but also by bourgeois writers discussing the (decadent) aristocracy. The political practices associated with this model may be characterized as “telic exclusion,” for they operate to eliminate the group in question from political, social, and economic power, while portraying that exclusion as inevitable historical progress. As this view is most important in periods of political change (such as during the shift from feudalism to capitalism, during the establishment of colonial domination, and so on), the political orientation associated with it is best referred to as “revolutionary liberalism.”

The positive version of this model is perhaps more common in elite circles today. Again, Asians form the most obvious group to which it is applied. While the Middle East is essential to the senile model, interestingly, it is rarely understood in terms of aged wisdom. Thus the primary groups conceived of in these terms are South and East Asians. This is the view of Indian gurus and Japanese Zen masters generalized as the character of a culture. In this model, the antirational, contemplative, recondite wisdom of the East is elevated above the mundane and rational science of the West. While this notion was perhaps most popular during the late 1960s, it is common enough at present, displayed prominently in a range of outlets from the writings of orientalists, to travel programs, to popular cinema and television.

Other status groups have been depicted in these terms as well, most obviously women. Indeed, certain feminists have been advocates of this view. The special wisdom of women’s antirational “intuition,” as well as their putative deeper human understanding and removal from the petty competitiveness of everyday life, are part of this model.

Another status group variously understood in these elevated terms is the peasantry. While the delinquent model has had widespread application to a nascent proletariat, and while the senile model has been employed in connection with the aristocracy (the proletariat and aristocracy being the two main enemies of the rising bourgeoisie), the wise model has been nostalgically invoked with respect to a vanishing peasantry. This nostalgic attitude can be clearly seen in (disaffected petit bourgeois) intellectuals and writers such as William Butler Yeats and in a number of the romantics who seek a lost wisdom in the folk.

When applied to the peasantry, this elevating view is associated with what classical marxist thinkers refer to as “romantic anticapitalism.” A more general term might be “romantic liberalism,” for this sort of modeling implies a “romantic antipatriarchy,” a “romantic anticolonialism,” and so on, all of which operate to romanticize the group in question—while still excluding its members from political, economic, and social power. In keeping with this, the political practices connected with this model are best labeled “romantic exclusion.”

THE DOMAIN OF ANIMACY

The second domain is, again, divisible into the subhuman or animal, the human, and the superhuman or angelic/demonic. The dominant group is understood as human and the various dominated groups are understood as sub- or superhuman. The “animal” model is perhaps the one most commonly recognized. It is roughly divisible into the (positive) “work animal” and the (negative) “wild animal,” but the two share a majority of properties. Members of status groups understood as bestial are thus viewed as unusually strong, perhaps athletic, and powerfully built. They are highly potent and sexually active, and their reproduction—physically signaled by large and prominent genitalia—is unconstrained by law or morals, except insofar as instinct produces moral effects, as when animal mothers care for their offspring. The intellectual capacities of members of this status group are almost nil, certainly below those of children. They are also judged as being less individual—a notion that actually makes no sense; it is merely a projection of the racist inability to distinguish individuals in other races (see Gerbrands 1978, 150).

In its negative or wild version, this model characterizes members of the relevant status group as violent—even rabid or mad—beasts who are prone

Figure 2. Animacy

WORK ANIMAL		ANGEL	
Strong, athletic, highly potent and sexually active, sexually well endowed, lacking morality (acts by instinct), very poor intellect, less individual		Selfless, devoted to the well-being of others, curative, desexualized, hyper-moral, with a spiritualized intellect	
Blacks, Irish, workers		Women	
Benevolent exploitation		Romantic exploitation	
“Soft” or pragmatic conservatism		Romantic conservatism	
HUMAN			
WILD ANIMAL		DEVIL	
Violent, prone to anarchic destruction and killing, otherwise as above		Devoted to the destruction of humanity, bearers of physical, mental, or spiritual disease, contagious, seductive, with an evil and manipulative intellect, identifiable only by a secret mark	
Blacks, Irish		Jews, heretics, “witches,” gays	
Punitive extermination		Telic extermination	
“Tough” or ideological conservatism		Revolutionary conservatism	

to unpredictable destruction and must be caged or killed. In its positive version, it portrays these people as solid, if dumb workers, who must be fed, harnessed, prodded, and whipped, but can work like an ox. Both versions lead to an almost complete disregard for the lives of the people in question.

Historically, this model underwrote slavery and certain aspects of colonialism in Africa. Such classic racist texts as Arthur de Gobineau’s (1856) *The Moral and Intellectual Diversity of Races* are explicit on the point. Thus he maintains that “the dark races are the lowest on the scale. The shape of the pelvis has a character of animalism” (443); they have a particularly acute sense of smell (444); their “anger is violent, but soon appeased” (445), and so they kill “without much provocation or subsequent remorse” (446); they lack any sense of vice and virtue (446), and so on—all clearly characteristics derived from a partially explicit animal model. In keeping with this, in his introduction to de Gobineau, H. Hotz maintained that the “Black Races”

have a “Feeble” intellect and “Animal Propensities” that are “Very strong” (94). As Sander Gilman (1985) notes, George Louis Leclerc, Count of Buffon, one of the founders of anthropology, went so far as to claim that blacks regularly copulate with apes (212). Frank Reeves (1983) cites one eighteenth-century writer who insisted that blacks have “bestial fleece, instead of hair” (39). The animality of blacks has been a commonplace of ultraright and fascist groups in the twentieth century also (see the bizarre claims cited in McCuen 1974, 56, 59–60, 62).

Unfortunately, this model extends beyond the ultraright. Frantz Fanon (1967) found that a majority of the whites he interviewed in the 1940s had the following associations with the word “Negro”: “biology, penis, strong, athletic, potent, boxer, Joe Louis, Jesse Owens, Senegalese troops, savage, animal,” and so on (166). Forty years later, Teun van Dijk (1987) did research on common views of a range of racial minorities in the Netherlands and United States. He found that they were widely perceived as prolific, aggressive, violent, criminal, dirty, lazy, and noisy (59). Thus, both studies elicited a combination of adolescent and animal characteristics.

The nearly complete disregard for the lives of black people, so painfully evident in the U.S. judiciary and police, indicates that this model is a frequent guide to action as well—whether in the casual brutalization or murder of blacks by police, or the refusal of white juries to think of brutalized or murdered blacks as humans and so to punish the malefactors. The Amadou Diallo case, both the police action and the jury’s decision, is the most obvious instance of this, but it is far from the only one. As noted in chapter 1, Salim Muwakkil (1997) has stressed that “police are using deadly force more and more frequently” against blacks (16), and cites Amnesty International reports on police brutality in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles. He does not need to illustrate the case by reference to Amadou Diallo. Rather, he points to “18-year-old Tyrone Lewis, an unarmed black man” who was “shot and killed . . . during a routine traffic stop”; “Joseph Gould, an unarmed homeless black man . . . shot to death” in Chicago; “Aaron White . . . shot to death” after “a traffic accident”; “James Cooper, a black 19-year-old . . . shot to death . . . during a traffic stop in Charlotte, N.C.”; and Jonny Gamage, a “31-year-old black businessman” who “died in the custody of five police officers after being stopped for ‘driving erratically’ ” (16–17).

In keeping with this, Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro (1989) point out

that “blacks and other racial minorities are far more likely than whites to be the victims of homicides” (43). What is worse, “the risk of a death sentence was far lower for those suspects charged with killing black people . . . than for those charged with killing whites.” In Georgia, for example, “those who killed whites were almost ten times as likely to be sentenced to death as those who killed blacks” (44). Moreover, “blacks who killed whites were several times more likely to be sentenced to death than whites who killed whites” (45).

The same model has operated with respect to laborers—and to the Irish, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the Irish were both colonized subjects and workers low in the microhierarchization of the working class. As Perry Curtis (1921) has demonstrated, during this period, the Irishman was repeatedly represented as “a dangerous ape-man” (vii); “some Victorians . . . went further by discovering features in Irish character which they took to be completely simian” (2). In 1860, Charles Kingley described the peasants of Mayo as “white chimpanzees,” and two years later, an article in *Punch* posited that the Irish were the missing link “manifestly between the Gorilla and the Negro” (quoted in *ibid.*, 100). Later in the century, the only chimpanzee in the London Zoo was named “Paddy” (101). Indeed, the connection with blacks was explicit, as the Irish were often referred to as “white negroes” (1), “Africanoid” (20), and the like. The British shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland—whether official, unofficial, or merely a matter of unreflective common practice—suggests that the bestial model still operates with respect to the Irish, at least some Irish Catholics (on the shoot-to-kill policy, see P. Jenkins 1988; Green 1988).

In short, like the other models discussed earlier, the bestial one provides a cognitive structure that leads individuals to enact and even extend discriminatory practices. These practices, in turn, reproduce aspects of racial and economic stratification, undermining modes of identification, empathy, and solidarity that would work against such stratification.

As divisions by spirituality are more rigidly differential than those by maturity, more extreme in distinguishing dominant and dominated groups, they are best associated not with paternalism and exclusion but with exploitation and extermination (on the difference between the racism of oppression or exploitation and that of extermination, compare Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 39). The work animal or “beast of burden” model, which

has also functioned historically as a model for the laboring classes, is the model of what might be called “benevolent exploitation”—straightforward exaction of labor power, but with the sort of benevolent attitude a farmer typically shows toward work animals. The political orientation associated with this model may be referred to as “soft” or pragmatic conservatism (that is, conservatism that allows the modification of conservative principles by reference to pragmatic considerations—such as the long-term productivity of the workers, general worker satisfaction, and so on; equivalently, “moderate” conservatism). The wild beast model is that of “punitive extermination,” which is to say, the physical harm or killing of individuals as “required” by their threatening animal violence, as in lynchings and the sorts of police actions just mentioned. It is linked with “tough” or ideological conservatism (that is, conservatism that does not allow principles to be modified by reference to practical concerns; equivalently, “hard-line” conservatism).

The “superhuman” models, “angelic” and “demonic,” complete this domain. These models share a characterization of the group as possessing special talents or powers and a related, systematic devotion (positive or negative) to the fate of humanity. The angelic model is the simpler of the two. It depicts members of the relevant status group as selflessly devoted to the well-being of others, with an intelligence that is completely spiritualized, which is to say entirely organized and guided by reference to ministering. Needless to say—despite John Milton’s views on the cupidity of angels—members of this group are desexualized; having no selfish desires whatsoever, they cannot be subject to carnal lust. Indeed, it is as if instinct has been replaced by a sort of hyper-moral drive, a drive that takes members of this group beyond mere conformity with moral precepts into a constant pursuit of benevolence.

I know of no status group for which this serves as a model other than that of women. This is the view of woman elevated above man into a sort of spiritual principle. It is the view of woman as the perfect mother, spiritual guide, or in literature, muse. In Christian mythology, this is found most obviously in the Virgin Mary; in European literature, the most famous case is probably Beatrice. Moreover, it is a model that continues to the present day, as various feminist and feminist-inspired analyses of modern literature and popular culture have revealed.

This model is related to that of the wise elder, but is even more con-

straining. It romanticizes the status group (women) and thus elevates it, but it does so in one area only: moral benevolence. There is no question of intellectual superiority or wisdom, a withdrawal from ordinary life, and such. It entails absolute devotion and selflessness. The political actions associated with this model might be referred to as “romantic exploitation” and the political orientation as “romantic conservatism.”

Finally, there is the demonic. Members of a status group understood in terms of this model are usually seen as highly intelligent, extremely sexual, and in some way physically degenerate. But more important, like the Devil who might seduce people into everlasting torment, they are the bearers of some ineradicable suffering. This may be religious error, yet it may equally be a form of physical disease or mental and social degeneracy. In any case, it is something that will destroy humanity. The demonic model in this way incorporates the domain of sickness/health, as does the partially parallel senile decadent model—though in the demonic version, the illness is contagious. Note that the angelic model involves the opposite implication, for the angelic woman is metaphorically—and as a selfless nurse, perhaps even literally—curative. Furthermore, members of such demonized status groups are identifiable only by a secret mark, like Satan with his cloven hoof. They know one another and conspire together. But they are often entirely unrecognizable to outsiders—that is, to “normal” humans. This obscurity is compounded by the fact that they may make use of members of other status groups to do their dirty work.

This paranoid fantasy of fascism and related politics is most often part of a telic emplotment of history in which a dominant group imagines that shadowy figures are seeking the overthrow of the present order, and must be stopped so that the given order may continue and reach its culmination. The activities of these figures, though sometimes only barely discernible, constitute a clear and present danger. Thus, they must be systematically exposed and exterminated. The political behaviors associated with this model may be referred to as “telic extermination” and the political orientation itself as “revolutionary conservatism.” The sharpest instance of this is, of course, Nazi Germany, probably the most complete culture of conformism in history.

Jews are the most obvious status group to have been conceived of in these terms. They have been widely viewed as shrewdly intelligent, clan-nish, and separatist. It is a racist commonplace that they already do con-

spiratorially control world government and finance, or are quickly maneuvering to do so in the future (see McCuen 1974, 142; Kushener 1989, 37–40; and Holmes 1989, 202–3). In *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler (1940) insisted that “the Jew today is the great agitator for the complete destruction of Germany. Whenever in the world we read about attacks on Germany, Jews are their fabricators” (906). Indeed, more generally, “if . . . the Jew conquers the nations of this world, his crown will become the funeral wreath of humanity” (84).

It is similarly commonplace that Jews are the brains behind the efforts of blacks to destroy civilization (McCuen 1974, 97). One specific threat posed by the Jew is the miscegenation of white and black—one form of undermining consent to racial stratification. As Hitler put it, “It was and is the Jews who bring the negro to the Rhine, always with the same concealed thought and the clear goal of destroying, by the bastardization which would necessarily set in, the white race which they hate” (448–49). Jews have also been widely seen as murderers and rapists (Gilman 1991, 117 ff.; see also Hitler 1940, 448), and the bearers of physical and mental disease, especially the doubly effective syphilis (Gilman 1991, 96).

Most significantly, Jews are not inevitably identifiable. Once they adopt an “assimilated” appearance, all that might remain as an identifying sign is the hidden mark of circumcision. Detlev Peukert (1982) refers to this as “the mythical hate-figure of the essential ‘Jew’ lurking behind the most disparate surface appearances” (209). In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler (1940) explained that he was slow in recognizing the Jewish threat because “their external appearance had become European and human” (67), and in a related way, he emphasized that they are the true “masters of lying” (313). The most graphic representation of this which I have seen is in a 1972 advertisement for the American Christian Party, in which the headline asks: WHO IS THIS MAN?? He LOOKS like an American/He DRESSES like an American/He SPEAKS the same language as Americans/But . . . HE IS A JEW!/DON’T TRUST HIM!!” (quoted in McCuen 1974, 177).

Of course, Jews have been explicitly linked with Satan as well. Hitler (1940) referred to Jews as “devils incarnate” (82) and maintained that “the personification of the Devil . . . assumes the living appearance of the Jew” (447). The official organ of the Ku Klux Klan averred in 1973 that “Jesus Christ revealed that the Jews . . . are the offspring of Satan” (quoted in McCuen 1974, 12; see also 141).

A number of other groups have been assimilated to the diabolic model, too. Perhaps the most striking case is that of homosexuals, who have been understood as concealed and socially dangerous. Heinrich Himmler feared homosexual deceitfulness and saw homosexuality as a grave threat to the future of the German nation, German culture, and the German people: "If this vice continues, it will be the end of Germany," he warned (quoted in Plant 1986, 89).

Historically, homosexuals were repeatedly linked with heretics and witches, and thus implicitly with Satan. As Louis Crompton (1985) points out, "From the start the medieval and Spanish Inquisitions ranked homosexuals with heretics as a class of persons to be sought out and destroyed" (13). In many countries, "executions for sodomy reached their height during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at the same time as witch hunts and heresy trials" (14). Crompton notes that in his 1748 *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu recognized the connection and placed homosexuality in the same legal category as heresy and witchcraft (16).

In recent years, the spread of AIDS and its association with homosexuality has revived the use of this model. The paranoid anecdotes one hears—usually with disclaimers—concerning gay men who are intentionally infecting straight women with the virus, the repeated references of the religious right to divine vengeance on Sodom, and even the otherwise prudent and necessary insistence of health officials that one cannot recognize someone who has AIDS, form a coherent and frightening pattern. It goes without saying that this sort of modeling fosters not only consent to but an extension of homophobic discrimination. Indeed, as a number of authors have observed, some recent proposals for dealing with AIDS victims are shockingly reminiscent of Nazism. Gilman (1991), for one, notes that in 1987, "a number of West German municipal officials had approved the idea for a new 'AIDS-camp' based on the plans for the infamous concentration camp at Sachsenhausen" (227).

CRY, THE BELOVED COUNTRY

In order to reveal the nature and function of these models, I have drawn on relatively explicit uses—direct references to blacks as animals or Jews as demons. Nonetheless, these models operate for the most part implicitly, guiding thought and action, fostering consent to and enactment of status hierarchies, in ways of which we are entirely unaware. The unselfconscious

operation of these models is, moreover, in many ways more significant than their explicit operation. After all, insofar as racist, sexist, or homophobic thinking is implicit, it is more difficult to recognize, and thus more difficult to counter. It is, in short, more thoroughly conformist.

For this reason, I will conclude by considering a more subtle case of racist modeling: Alan Paton's *Cry, the Beloved Country*. As I have argued elsewhere (Hogan 1992–1993) Paton has genuine sympathy for his main character, the gentle black minister, Stephen Kumalo. But he develops this sympathy in a context that is paternalistic. His attitude recalls John H. Duckitt's (1992) observation that "to the extent that members of the subordinate group accept their inferiority and respectfully acquiesce in their oppression, members of the dominant group may experience positive affect toward them" (101). Paton's own politics, as expressed in the novel, are a version of benevolent paternalistic liberalism, but with distinct punitive elements as well. This combination is unsurprising, as the difference between these views is largely one of attitude relative to topicalization. When he thinks of the slow-witted minister, Paton's attitude is positive and his politics are benevolent; when he thinks of the murderous black gangsters, his attitude is negative and a punitive pragmatism enters—though his overall tendency is to stress the former over the latter.

Paton does not confine the problematic of the novel to his own preferences, however. He extends it slightly beyond the alternatives of ideological and pragmatic liberalism. While he does not include any genuinely human alternative, any alternative, such as marxism, that does not distinguish between blacks and whites in terms of these models at all, Paton does incorporate elements of pragmatic and ideological conservatism.

In terms of the domains explored here, then, Paton's presentation of blacks is largely based on the childhood model—both prepubescent and adolescent—with the two versions of the animal model entering at points.

For my purposes, what is important about Paton's use of these domains is that it does not simply involve the use of explicit characterizations of Africans as children or animals but the generation of a broad range of ideas about blacks and whites, about relations between them, as well as a wide variety of images, narrative elements, and so forth, all of which rely implicitly on these models. At each point in the story, as Paton is faced with choices of character and action, the models operate to push his decision in

a certain direction. For example, even when the blacks in question are literally adults and the whites are literally children, these models lead Paton to depict the latter as more adult than the former. The operation of these models is so ubiquitous, in fact, that they extend beyond character to setting and imagery as well.

The general argument of the novel, explicit in a treatise by the murdered hero, Arthur Jarvis, is that traditional African society was greatly inferior to Christian, European society. Hence, it was morally right for Europeans to destroy indigenous culture. Europeans erred, however, in failing to replace African barbarity with Christian civilization. As Jarvis puts it, "It was permissible to allow the destruction of a tribal system" consisting in "violence and savagery . . . superstition and witchcraft. . . . But it is not permissible to watch its destruction, and to replace it by nothing," for after all, "we are a Christian people" and as such, "we shall never . . . be able to evade the moral issues." The result of this neglect is that "a whole people [has] deteriorate[d] physically and morally" (Paton 1987, 146), leading to "the deterioration of native family life . . . poverty, slums and crime" (145). That is, whites have not been good parents. They have rightly ended the childish—or perhaps animalistic—ways of the natives, but they have not fulfilled the duty of all parents to educate their children. Jarvis makes the use of this model almost explicit: "Society has always . . . educated its children so that they grow up law-abiding, with socialized aims and purposes" (ibid.), yet Europeans have failed to do this with the natives (146).

To make it clear that Jarvis's views are true—so true that they are shared even by blacks themselves—this excerpt from his treatise is preceded by a testimonial, a letter of praise and gratitude. In keeping with the underlying model of the novel, the letter is "from the secretary of the Claremont African Boys' Club" (144)—another obvious, if implicit, manifestation of the childhood model of blacks. As Reverend Msimangu testifies, "It is not in my heart to hate a white man. It was a white man who brought my father out of darkness" (25), implicitly making his own father a child with respect to the white man. Msimangu goes on to explain that the problem is that this "bringing out of darkness" has been incomplete with most natives. As Jarvis argues, the parental work must be continued and extended.

The idea is taken up later, again indirectly, in the novel's school for the blind. Speaking both literally and metaphorically, Msimangu tells Stephen

Kumalo, “It will lift your spirits to see what the white people are doing for our blind” (71). In the course of the visit to the school, the metaphorical and paternalistic meaning becomes increasingly apparent: “It was white men who . . . came together to open the eyes of black men that were blind” (89). The visit culminates in a church service in which the white man’s effort “to open the blind eyes” (90) of Africans is explicitly presented as a matter of religious education—the duty of parents to children.

Moreover, in defining the broader problematic within which he wishes the debate to unfold, Paton does not contrast his view with that of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), African National Congress (ANC), or anyone who might consider blacks to be fully adult, and who might see whites as guilty not of withholding education but of practicing gross brutality. Rather, he goes on to oppose his benevolent paternalism to a politics of benevolent exploitation, based on a bestial model: “We go so far as to credit Almighty God with having created black men to hew wood and draw water for white men” (154). Though Jarvis, and Paton, reject this view, the novel makes clear that it marks out the only real alternative to paternalism; these two positions implicitly define the problematic within which the novel unfolds.

Paton does present a version of ANC and CPSA views, without naming them explicitly, but he does so in such a way as to exclude them from the range of rational discussion. For example, John Kumalo (Stephen Kumalo’s “evil” brother) articulates an understanding of South African society that is in keeping with the analyses of the ANC and CPSA—and more important, with the facts of white racism and the exploitation of blacks. But Paton dismisses John as having “a voice to move thousands, with no brain behind it” (183). He also has John betray his brother and nephew, evidently allowing his nephew to die, so that his own son will not go to jail. This reprehensible action serves to undermine any moral status John might have. In this context, John’s opinions are well beyond the limits of reasonable discourse. This is relevant here because John is largely presented in terms of the adolescent model—sneaky, deceitful, criminal, disloyal to family. His son is literally a juvenile delinquent, and their similarity in this regard is implicitly stressed by John’s behavior during his son’s criminal trial. Indeed, John even evidences the sort of sexual promiscuity associated with the adolescent model, for he is living in sin with another woman after having separated from his wife.

This treatment of John is, furthermore, part of an undermining of black leadership of any sort—a necessary consequence of the childhood model of blacks. After all, adults are leaders; children are followers. If blacks are children, then they cannot be leaders. Thus, of the three nonwhite leaders in the book, only “a brown man named Tomlinson” (39) has “brains” (43). Only the man who is half white, in other words, has adult intelligence. In contrast, one white leader, Hoernle, has the best attributes of all three men (46), without their flaws. It is obvious who should be the leader in this context: the fully adult white man, with the half-white man serving as an intermediary to the blacks who have no brains.

The traditional chief in the novel is only marginally better than John. He is assimilated to the infantile model, not the adolescent one, but he is foolish and untutored—not innocent and goodly, like Stephen. Specifically, he spends his day riding about with his counselors and wearing ludicrous clothing (for example, “he wore a fur cap such as they wear in cold countries” [229]). When a surveying team comes to the area, he tries to imitate them, pretending in a decidedly infantile and even embarrassing manner that he is undertaking the same professional task, just as a small child might do.

The explicit arguments of Jarvis/Paton are instantiated in the plot and characterization of the novel as a whole—again, primarily through the development of the childhood model. The African characters are largely divided into childlike innocents, on the one hand, and oversexualized adolescent criminals, on the other—with the men in the latter group being murderers, and the women being prostitutes. In keeping with the broader problematic of the novel, however, there is, again, some use of the animal model. Early in the novel, the reader learns that Stephen Kumalo’s wife reacts “with the patient suffering of black women, with the suffering of oxen” (10). Shortly afterward, the reader is told of a “strong smell” in the non-European train carriage (13), a repetition of the racist commonplace that blacks emit an animal-like odor. When Stephen meets his sister, she “looks at him sullenly, like an animal that is tormented” (30); subsequently, she acts out this animalism by falling on the floor and crying “louder and louder” with “no shame” (31). The only clear use of wild animal imagery is with John and his followers, for he has “the voice of a bull or a lion” (36; see also 39, 183), and when he “growls,” the people “growl” also. It is not surprising that the passive Mrs. Kumalo is assim-

lated to a gentle work animal (an ox), while the rabble-rousing ANC-associated John Kumalo is assimilated to the violent and dangerous bull or lion (implicitly, to be hunted and killed by “man”).

Yet again, the more common models are drawn from childhood. Stephen is the clearest case of a good child, open to the paternal instruction of whites, such as Jarvis. Right at the outset, the reader is told that “Kumalo’s voice rose a little, as does the voice of a child” (13). When someone takes his arm, it is “like walking with a child” (95). When faced with the complexities of trains, buses, and city life, he is overcome with childish panic and “his heart beats like that of a child,” until he calls out to the paternal, Christian deity (17). When asked a question, he answers “obediently” (23). And most of all, Stephen is filled with childlike gratitude to kindly, parental white people: “Kumalo’s face wore the smile . . . of a black man when he sees one of his people helped in public by a white man” (50–51). At the end of the novel, when he has returned to his village, he “sits there like a child” in a meeting with his Bishop (260).

Even more significantly, Stephen plays with Jarvis’s young son as if they were the same age. Indeed, the little boy speaks and acts in a more obviously adult manner than Stephen ever does. While Stephen is continually compared to a child, this child, when dealing with Stephen, is compared to an adult, in keeping with the modeling at the base of the novel: “The small white boy . . . walked over to [Stephen’s] house with the assurance of a man, and dusted his feet and took off his cap before entering the house” (248). Consistent with this general relation, Stephen refers to the senior Jarvis’s wife as “the mother” (257), and Paton presents an image of all the blacks mourning her death as if she were their mother (258). (It is worth recalling that Jarvis’s huge land holdings were simply stolen from these same blacks and that the 1913 Land Act reserved roughly 90 percent of South African land for whites, even though blacks constituted over 75 percent of the population [Simons and Simons 1969, 131]. Given this context, such childlike love seems singularly unlikely.) Finally, when James Jarvis (Arthur Jarvis’s father) undertakes to help these Africans, of all the things he could do, his first gesture is the parental act of giving them milk (Paton 1987, 237).

Stephen’s daughter-in-law is a sort of transitional case. She has had a child out of wedlock, thus demonstrating the type of unconstrained sexuality associated with the adolescent model. But she has not lost her “de-

pendent and affectionate nature" (247). When they meet, she looks at Stephen "with strange innocence" (113), and when he asks her to join his family, "she clap[s] her hands like a child" (116). She is like the other "natives" on the train, who "talk like children" (220), when she goes to the village, or like the woman who was "more like a child than a woman" (221). She can still be saved. She has almost passed over the threshold into destructive adolescence, yet she maintains enough of her childlike innocence that it is possible to "reclaim" and educate her.

Stephen's son, Absolom, on the other hand, is more clearly adolescent. He has not only fathered an illegitimate child (perhaps even many illegitimate children, with different mothers [68]); he has also committed "the most terrible deed that a man can do. . . . He has killed a white man" (111; those who imagine this to be a peculiarly South African bias should recall that in the United States, the murder of whites is far more severely punished than the murder of blacks [Gross and Mauro 1989, 44]). Absolom is ultimately executed for his crime. But he is only a small part of the problem. Paton's portrayal of "native" men is consistently criminal. The entire country is plagued by "young criminal children" (adolescents, as the novel makes clear), "young men and young girls that went away and forgot their customs and lived loose and idle lives," violent teens who steal, rape, and murder "nearly every day" (22). In keeping with this, Reverend Msimangu laments the "tragic things" about life in South Africa—specifically, that "children break the law, and old white people are robbed and beaten" (26). More details of crimes committed by "our young boys" (44) are subsequently revealed. Most important, one central image in the novel for admirable action in rebuilding society, for aiding blacks, is the reformatory. The relation of this image to the adolescent model is too obvious to require elaboration.

It is perhaps worth mentioning the situation faced by blacks in South Africa in the 1940s when the novel was written; the disabilities affecting blacks included virtual exclusion from land ownership (see Simons and Simons 1969, 131), wages for labor paid at roughly one-tenth the rate of whites (Callinicos 1981, 154), complete political disenfranchisement, and subjection to a range of other economically, psychologically, and physically debilitating laws. It is also worth highlighting that a large number of criminal laws applied to blacks only and that the vast majority of criminal convictions of black people were for violations of those laws. For example,

figures from slightly before the events of the novel show that almost 80 percent of black “crime” would not have been crime under a nonracist legal system (*ibid.*, 210). In addition, the remaining crimes of murder and robbery were slight when compared with the vastly greater murder and robbery perpetrated legally by whites. Consider theft. Whites simply stole 90 percent of the land and virtually all the mineral resources—which is to say, virtually all the national wealth. Purses and wallets pilfered by black muggers amounted to almost nothing by comparison. Similar points could be made about murder. It is crucial to keep this in mind in order to recognize fully the degree to which Paton’s image of a saving reformatory is the product of a racist cognitive model and not the real conditions in South Africa.

Paton’s novel has been widely praised in the United States. For years, it was required reading in many U.S. high schools, and still may be. Only a few years ago, it was made into a major motion picture. In short, this is not some “marginal” racist text. Quite the contrary. In the West, at least—and especially in the United States—it has been widely viewed as a profound and moving exploration of and response to racial problems.

Readers of Paton in the United States will recognize why this is so. The novel largely represents the problematic in which mainstream debates about race have unfolded in this country. Despite the horrible economic deprivation of African Americans, despite the constant and debilitating racism they suffer, despite the facts about crime and punishment discussed in the preceding chapters, the entire debate about race problems in this country attempts to respond to the question, “What is wrong with black people?” The presuppositions of this question are not only empirically false but morally obscene. To make matters worse, the debate itself is polarized between a racist conservatism and a racist liberalism, the former relying on an animal model, the latter relying on a childhood model, in keeping with the preceding analyses and Paton’s novel. The Right adopts the view that blacks are subhuman (with, for example, genetically inferior intellectual capacities, according to Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in *The Bell Curve*) and animalistic—“created [by God] . . . to hew wood and draw water for white men” (154), in Paton’s phrase. Liberals, in turn, adopt the view that blacks are trapped in a “culture of poverty”—that their “simple system of order and tradition and convention has been destroyed,” that they live without socialization and morality, and that is why “our

natives today produce criminals and prostitutes and drunkards” (146). In short, the national problematic is limited to precisely the options set out in Paton’s novel. This is partly because it relies on the same sorts of cognitive modeling, the same implicit use of the domains of age and animacy, to justify the same type of unjustifiable hierarchy, and to foster not only passive consent but active reproduction of that hierarchy.